

Analyzing the Success Rate of Strategic and Tactical Economic Sanctions; A strategy for Russian economic planning

SeyedAmirhossein Alavifar

Russian State University of Tourism and Service

Moscow, Russian Federation

Amir_alavifar@yahoo.com

Victor Makarovich Zaernyuk

Russian State Geological Prospecting University

Moscow, Russian Federation

zvm4651@mail.ru

Abstract- The results of a study in 1995 showed that about 70 percent of economic sanctions that have lasted more than 3 years have failed in the achievement of predetermined objectives in changing the behavior or political system in the target country. Then in 1997, a study was conducted that evaluated the effectiveness of economic sanctions about 34%. On the other hand, in terms of the objectives of sanctions, the sanctions are usually imposed for two main purposes: Punitive sanctions to change the behavior of governments (tactical sanctions), and comprehensive sanctions to change the political system or ruling government in the target country (strategic sanctions). This paper tries to supplement the 1995 study by Van Bergeijk and Van Marrewijk to analyze the correlation between "the sanctions success " and "the sanctions duration ", and examine the hypothesis that these two variables have always had a negative correlation over the history of economic sanctions since World War II to the present time, and only two of the 13 cases of strategic economic sanctions have been successful (about 15%). Finally, with combination of these two hypotheses, it is concluded that long-term strategic sanctions are very likely doomed to failure. This approach can be used for strategic economic planning of Russia that is target of western strategic sanctions.

Keywords: strategic economic sanctions, tactical economic sanctions, economy of resistance, sanctions success rate.

I. INTRODUCTION

The first round of western sanctions against Russia started on 17 March 2014, a day after holding a referendum on the Crimean peninsula, and a few hours before signing the document to recognize the result of the referendum by Vladimir Putin. In this round of sanctions, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and European Union were participated, and established the most widespread sanctions against Russia after the Soviet collapse in 1991. The second round of sanctions started on 28 April 2014 by the United States of America and European Union in a targeted way against individuals such as Igor Schein and several companies. In a document published in this round of sanctions, the European Union stated that although these sanctions are not punitive, but are considered to change the behavior of individuals in target countries (1). The third round of sanctions against Russia, mainly began in July 2014 and continued in collaboration with Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland and Japan, were tended to strategic sanctions, so that in an interview with David Cohen in May 2014 On the effect of sanctions imposed by the

United States against Russia, the American analyst and host of GPS at CNN channel, Fareed Zakaria, Asked Cohen to explain why people who claim ineffectiveness of sanctions against Russia are wrong. And in response, Cohen replied that, he believes sanctions are strategic and robust, and what the United States has done is sanctioning individuals who have contributed to violation of the Ukraine privacy. On the other hand, according to AFP on December 15, 2014, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated the purpose of Western sanctions against his country is to change the political system in Moscow, and called the sanctions strategic. In response to the question that whether the sanctions attempt to change the political system in Moscow, he answered: "I have a very important reason to think that the purpose of the sanctions against the Russia is to change the political system of this country" (2). By reviewing what has happened in Russia's relations with European Union and the United States, this paper seeks to address these questions: What are the sanctions? What is the difference between strategic and tactical sanctions? How is efficiency and effectiveness of sanctions during the history? Are longer and more comprehensive sanctions necessarily more successful? And is there any variables significant relationship between "the sanctions duration" and "the sanctions success rates"?

The knowledge of the probability of success and the efficiency and effectiveness of economic sanctions for countries, whether from the perspective of imposing or targeting countries may have the consequence that both parties may adopt diplomacy in conflict resolution earlier, and may eliminate options for sanctions and war that mostly have lasting adverse effects. An advantage of studies such as this paper is to emphasized that with the advent of the information age and public enlightenment, focusing on solving problems through wars and military actions as well as economic sanctions is not only against human rights standards, but is affordable from the pragmatism and effectiveness perspective. With a statistical analysis of the outcome of the sanctions, it can be argued that the catastrophic results have always been much more than positive and successful results.

As Mohsen Emadi (2010) illustrated, the Security Council has rarely had a human rights approach in its decisions on sanctions, and is not only unresponsive to human rights norms, but also violates those norms (3). According to the UN Charter, the Security Council is committed to "promote and encourage respect for human rights". Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and principles of international law, the executive power of the Security Council is bound to observing the norms of human rights and humanitarian law. Article 24 of the Charter asks the Council to use its power to maintain peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. One of the most important principles and purposes mentioned in Article I of the Charter is promotion of human rights. In fact, the introduction of the Charter starts with the words "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person ..." (4).

Especially in Articles 55 and 56, the UN Charter clearly refers to higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development, and universal respect for, and observance of, human rights. Article 56 of the Charter asks all Members to pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55. Article 62 of the Charter, asks the Economic and Social Council to prepare recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. As a result, the Human Rights Commission was established and in 2006 were eventually replaced by the Human Rights Council. In addition, many of the conventions and treaties on human rights have been discussed and approved within the UN system. Technically, the Security Council is not party to the treaties as states. However, each of these treaties are interpretation of the human rights view of the charter, that binds the Security Council to the principles of these treaties through Article 24 of the Charter (4).

However, Emadi noted in his article that the Security Council as one of the principal organs of the United Nations, violates human rights of citizens of countries under sanctions with the implementation of economic sanctions. It should also be noted that in the history of economic sanctions, imposition of unilateral sanctions

(mostly by the United States of America) has been more frequent than sanctions issued by the League of Nations and later the United Nations (3).

Apart from the negative impacts of economic sanctions against countries in the fields of democracy, human rights, and change in the political structure of target countries, this paper intends to evaluate the sanctions success rate in a pragmatic approach, and examining successful and unsuccessful sanctions, it tries to identify success factors and examine the hypothesis that whether we can emphasize on the process of international diplomacy based on the likelihood of the failure of Western economic sanctions, to solve the challenging issues in the negotiations from an equal position. The answer is yes, and to prove this claim, first some common concepts should be defined.

A. Definition of economic sanctions

The term embargo is used to describe the trade restrictions forced to change the policy of another state, and includes Sanction (meaning refusing to sell goods to the country under sanctions) and Boycott (meaning refusing to buy goods from the country under sanctions) (5) (6) .

Embargoes are tools for forcing a specific foreign policy to countries, and started from 1940, when Franklin Roosevelt imposed sanctions on Japan. Most of these sanctions take the form of bilateral exchanges, for example against Cuba (United States), Haiti 1993-94 (United Nations and United States), Iraq (United Nations), Sierra Leone 1997 (West African Economic Association), and Burundi (neighboring countries) (7).

B. Strategic and tactical sanctions

The purpose of economic sanctions is not out of two general objectives,

1. To change the political system or ruling government of a country, that is called strategic sanctions (or comprehensive sanctions).
2. To change a country's political behavior (internal or external political behavior) that is called tactical sanctions (8).

C. Implementation of sanctions

According to the book "Economic sanctions: a new direction in the twenty-first century", economic sanctions are usually implemented in four ways: Financial and monetary sanctions (e.g. sanctions against the Central Bank), export sanctions, import sanctions (boycott), and a combination of these three methods. The case already applied are presented in Table 1. (9)

Table1. Implementation methods of sanctions in the history of economic sanctions

Method of Sanction	Quantity	Percentage
Export, Import, Finance	62	32.12 %
Finance	53	27.46 %
Export, Import	40	20.73 %
Import, Finance	19	5.18 %
Export, Finance	28	14.51 %

I. Literature Review

A. Effectiveness of economic sanctions policy

In 1997, Robert Pape showed in his study that the economic sanctions success rate is 34%. In other words, economic sanctions have been successful only in 34% of cases (5). It is noteworthy that before the Second World War, economic sanctions had a greater chance of success. Based on available information, success rates of sanctions before World War II, between the two world wars, were 50%. Since the Second World War, especially after the 1970s, the success rate of economic sanctions has fallen sharply (7). For example, the average success rate of sanctions implemented between 1970 and 1990 were close to 20%. The reason for this can be found in three phenomena. First, globalization and growing international trade have caused each country to meet its economic needs through various countries, and not to be depending on only one country. As a result, the effectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions applied by one country has reduced dramatically. The second reason is prevalence of Cold War on international relations during the 1945- 1990, that has made consensus for a comprehensive UN sanctions too difficult. The third reason is the rapid and imprudent growth in use of economic sanctions policy since the 1990s. This reduced the accuracy of selection, design, and implementation of economic sanctions. As a result, many sanctions that have been applied and developed since the 90s were inappropriate and ineffective for their intended purposes (7).

This is while even the success rate of 34% has been criticized by many economists in the world, as far as an article published by Adam Taylor in the Washington Post in 2014 claims only 13 cases of sanctions imposed from 1925 to 2002 has been quite successful, that reduced the success rate sanctions to 6% (8). However, it can be noted that the analysis of the success of economic sanctions simply by yes or no propositions is impossible. In other words, a sanction cannot be a 100 percent successful or 100 percent unsuccessful. Thus, in a study conducted in 2007 at the Peterson Institute for International Economic, the degree of success of economic sanctions was evaluated quantitatively (based on fuzzy method) on a scale of 1-16 (10). The results of that study are considered the basis of current analysis. Full results of the study at the Peterson Institute is attached to this article as inputs.

B. Studies on the effectiveness of economic sanctions

Dursan Peksen (2006) in a paper examined the impact of the United States unilateral sanctions on trade flows between the target and a third country in two views, using gravity model and panel data over the period 1975-2000. The overall findings suggest that the United States sanctions lead to a reduction in the trade flow between the target country and third countries. The results also point to a significant difference between the OECD and non-OECD countries, the disturbance in trade is relatively low for OECD countries, while the negative impact of sanctions on non-OECD countries is considerable (11).

Raul Caruso (2000), applied two methods in his study to estimate the negative impact of economic sanctions in international trade. Using a gravity model, the project examined bilateral trade between the United States and 49 other countries during the period 1960-2000. The results of first method suggest that comprehensive sanctions have a significant negative impact on bilateral trade of target countries, while it is not the same for limited sanctions. The second method approach the impact of the United States unilateral sanctions on the volume of bilateral trade between target countries and other countries of the G-7 at the same period. The findings suggest that unilateral large sanctions have huge negative impacts, while limited sanctions have a slight positive effect on bilateral trade between the target country and other G-7 countries. In general, both estimates indicate that multilateral sanctions have a large negative impact on trade flows (12).

Akbarifard et al. (2010), reviewed the comprehensive sanctions of the Security Council and its effect on regional integration of Iran in two blocks of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and D8 using gravity model and panel data over the period 1995-2010. The results suggest that sanctions against Iran do not have a significant effect on Iran's regional integration in ECO block, while the sanctions on the Group D8 led to more divergence (13).

Hadinejad et al. (2010), examined the effects of economic sanctions on Iran's non-oil trade during the period 1977-2006. The estimated sample was 42 countries elected from the economic partners of Iran. The results indicate that the comprehensive sanctions had significant effects on the Iran's non-oil trade during the period under study (14). Ziaee Bigdeli et al. (2009), studied the effects of economic sanctions on bilateral trade of Iran with 30 partners during the period 1973-2007. For this purpose, they applied generalized gravity model and panel data. The results of their study suggest that the sanctions have a negative slight impact on Iran's trade with its business partners (15) (16).

C. Successful examples of economic sanctions

Based on the primary objectives of economic sanctions mentioned before, i.e. change of the political system (or regime) in strategic or comprehensive sanctions or change in internal or external political behavior in tactical sanctions, according to Adam Taylor's article in Washington Post, there are only 13 out of 200 successful sanctions against countries from 1925 to 2002 (8). Thus, the success rate is about 6 percent (which is much less than what stated by Robert Pape and Van Bergejik in 1995 and 1997). Table 2 shows complete information on the successful sanctions.

Table 2-13. Examples of successful sanctions

ID	Year	Country Imposer	Target Country	The Sanction Duration	Type of Sanction	Cost of Sanction for targeted countries (Percentage of GDP)
1	1921	League Of Nations	Yugoslavia	Less than a year	Tactical Sanction	-
2	1925	League Of Nations	Greece	Less than a year	Tactical Sanction	-
3	1948	USA	Netherlands	1 year	Tactical Sanction	1.10%
4	1958	USSR	Finland	5 Month	Tactical Sanction	1.10%
5	1961	USA	Ceylon (Sri Lanka)	4 years	Tactical Sanction	0.60%
6	1965	USA	India	2 years	Tactical Sanction	0.08%
7	1975	USA	South Korea	1 year	Tactical Sanction	-
8	1976	USA	Taiwan	1 year	Tactical Sanction	0.10%
9	1982	South Africa	Lesotho	4 years	Tactical Sanction	0.10%
10	1987	USA	Salvador	1 year	Tactical Sanction	-
11	1992	USA	Malawi	1 year	Strategic Sanction	-
12	1993	USA	Guatemala	Less than a year	Tactical Sanction	1.30%
13	1994	Germany	Albania	1 year	Tactical Sanction	2.90%

D. Negative consequences of comprehensive economic sanctions

Strategic sanctions have a comprehensive scope in the societies, and have been employed against countries in several series of sanctions with varying degrees of success (10). These sanctions are called "deadly weapons" or "blunt instruments" that provide the context for collective punishment and suffering (17) of ordinary citizens who live in countries under economic sanctions. The comprehensive sanctions mostly influence the vulnerable groups of the society, i.e. children, women and then the sick and the deprived people of the society (10). These sanctions can also have harmful consequences for the neighboring countries (18).

With respect to all aspects and considering the negative consequences of comprehensive strategic sanctions, it is observed that sometimes the results of sanctions for ordinary people in the target country may be more disastrous than hostile military actions (19). Nevertheless, the indecency of military actions in moral and legal terms is clearer than the imposition of comprehensive sanctions (20).

Therefore, due to the heavy cost many ordinary people incur during strategic sanctions, today, scientists introduce smart and tactical sanctions as alternatives, since the use of smart sanctions expanded since the 1990 by the European Union and the United Nations system for increased public concern of the effects and human damage of comprehensive sanctions at the time of the Cold War (10). However, the imposition of unilateral strategic and comprehensive sanctions by countries, especially the United States of America still continues.

Table 3 shows the frequency of economic sanctions in terms of political objectives. As mentioned in the initial definitions, the sanctions that aim a fundamental change such as change in the political system or ruling government of the country are considered strategic or comprehensive sanctions, and sanctions that merely seek to change the behavior of states are known as targeted and tactical sanctions. However, sometimes the type of sanctions cannot be directly found through the declared aim. For example, although the sanctions against Iran are declared to be in order to change the behavior of the Iranian government on the nuclear issue, or in other words is pretended to be a tactical sanction, they are in fact established for comprehensive pressure and taking advantage of all punitive tools, and so are actually classified as comprehensive and strategic sanctions.

Table 3. Effectiveness of sanctions based on objectives

Political Target	Cases of success	Cases of Failure	Total	The success rate
The Minor changes in domestic policy	22	21	43	51%
Major policy changes in the target country	10	23	33	30%
Military impairment	9	20	29	31%
Violation of military adventures	4	15	19	21%
Regime change and democratization	25	55	80	31%
Total	70	134	204	34%

II. Research methodology

This theoretical and applied study aims to use philosophical recognition method based on reasoning and descriptive research methodology to identify characteristics of a variables in a statistical population (all economic sanctions from 1990 to 2002) to analyze the hypothesis that: the success rate of economic sanctions has a negative correlation with sanctions duration. For this purpose, Pearson correlation coefficient method is used. The coefficient is based on the covariance and standard deviation of two variables. The correlation coefficient formula is shown in equation 1:

$$r_{xy} = \frac{cov(x,y)}{s_x s_y} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \bar{x})^2 \sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - \bar{y})^2}}$$

The correlation coefficient will be between (-1) to (+1). The "direction" and "value" of the relation defined as follows (14):

Table4. Different modes of the correlation between the two variables and r-value

Correlation	Coefficient R
Full inverse correlation	-1
A moderate inverse correlation	-0.3 = <r<-1
A weak inverse correlation	-0.3<r<0
Uncorrelated	0
A weak direct correlation	0<r<0.3
A Moderate direct correlation	0.3<r=<1
Full direct correlation	1

Statistical population: As explained earlier, the statistical population of this article consists of data in the Peterson Economic Studies Institute in 2007 that were evaluated by countries and international organizations using fuzzy method. In order to achieve a realistic interpretation of economic conditions of the date, statistical data on sanctions from 1990 to 2002 were the collected, including 66 sanctions. The results will be discussed in the next section of the paper.

III. Results and findings

Hypothesis analysis: an increase in the sanctions duration will reduce the sanctions success rate.

In order to analyze the hypothesis and have the ability to accept or reject it, first it should be determined whether there is a linear relationship between variables, or not? Therefore, in the first step, the presence or absence of a significant linear relationship between two variables is examined.

Null hypothesis: There is no significant linear relationship between sanctions duration (SD) and success rates of sanctions (SRS).

H0: $\beta_i = 0$

Hypothesis 1: There is a significant linear relationship between sanctions duration (SD) and success rates of sanctions (SRS).

H1: $\beta_i \neq 0$

Test results in a 95 percent confidence level are shown in Table 6:

Independent variables: sanctions duration (SD)

Dependent variable: success rates of sanctions (SRS)

Table5. Summary of statistical data of variables

Group	Count	Sum	Average	Variance
SRS	65	461	7.09308	14.86635
SD	65	323	4.969231	26.21779

Table6. Variance analysis of variables

Source of Variations	SS	Df	MS	F	P-Value	F Crit
Between Groups	146.4923	1	146.4923	7.131332	0.008558	3.915138
Within Groups	2629.385	128	20.54207			
Total	2775.877	129				

Based on the results of variance analysis, as shown in Table 6, since the P-value of the test is less than 5%, the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, there is a linear relationship between these two variables.

After making sure that there is a significant linear relationship between two variables, Pearson's correlation coefficient can be measured for them. The Pearson correlation coefficient provides the information for acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis. This analysis is presented in Table 7.

Null hypothesis: There is no significant correlation between sanctions duration (SD) and success rates of sanctions (SRS).

H0: $\rho_{xy} = 0$

Hypothesis 1: There is a significant correlation between sanctions duration (SD) and success rates of sanctions (SRS).


H1: $\rho_{xy} \neq 0$

Table 7 - Calculation of Pearson's correlation coefficient

	SRS	SD
SRS	1	-0,280910945
P-Value		0.022785
Qty	66	66
SD	-0,280910945	1
P-Value	0.022785	
Qty	66	66

As shown in Table 7, since the P-value of the test is less than 5%, the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is confirmed. In other words, it is proved that There is a significant negative correlation between sanctions duration and success rates of sanctions, and with increase in duration time of sanctions, the likelihood of success reduces. Distribution of these variables can be seen in the figure 1.

Figure1. Diagram for distribution of variables: the X-axis is sanctions duration and the Y-axis is the success rate for sanctions.



IV. CONCLUSIONS

Since the Second World War, 20 economic sanctions have been imposed to prevent access to nuclear weapons; only two cases of them were resulted in complete withdrawal of target countries from nuclear activities. These two cases included South Korea and Taiwan, were that were sanctioned by the Unites States in 1975 and 1976 respectively. American sanctions cost amounted to 0.1% of GDP for both countries, and led to the withdrawal of both countries in less than a year (10). Of these 20 cases, 14 cases of sanctions were American unilateral sanctions against other countries. Moreover, of 200 sanctions imposed against different countries from 1925 to 2002, 19 cases were related

to changing political system of countries (9%), that was successful only in one case, Guatemala. In other cases, the average rate of success of sanctions is 7 of 16 .

This paper tried to review the literature on economic sanctions between the first and second world wars, and after World War II, and divided the sanctions into two strategic and tactical categories based on political objectives. Next, it was shown that since strategic and comprehensive sanctions impose the highest pressure on the most vulnerable population such as children, women, the sick and the deprived groups, it has never been less dirty than military hostile actions, and even causes more lasting costs to the international community. On the other hand, according to the assessment of "success rate of economic sanctions", it was proved that there is a negative correlation between this variable and "Sanctions Duration". In other words, the likelihood of success of economic sanctions (including strategic and tactical sanctions) decreases over time. The combination of these two approaches shows that long-term strategic economic sanctions, in particular sanctions against Iran and more recently Russia, are very likely to fail in terms of achieving political goals predicted, and only will result in widespread negative humanitarian consequences.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This research was supported by Bstech Lim co. (Toofan Zehni Fanavari). We thank our colleagues from Bstech lim Co. who provided insight and expertise that greatly assisted the research, although they may not agree with all of the interpretations/conclusions of this paper.

REFERENCES

1. **EU measures.** *EU restrictive measures.* s.l. : Council of the European Union, 2014.
2. **MehrAgencyNews.** The goals of Anti-Russian Sanctions. *Mehra Agency News.* [Online] November 12, 2014. <http://www.mehrnews.com/news/2444881/>
3. *The impact of economic sanctions of the UN Security Council on Human Rights.* **Emadi, Mohsen.** 1, Tehran : Journal of Foreign Policy, 2012, Foreign Policy Quarterly, Vol. 26, pp. 121-161.
4. **UN Charter.** *united nations universal declaration of human rights.* New York : United nation, 1948.
5. *Why Economic Sanctions Do not Work?* **Pape, Raber A.** 2, s.l. : International Security, 1997, Internationa Security, Vol. 22, pp. 90-136.
6. *The impact of economic sanctions on healthcare affiars; a Case study of Iran.* **Dashti S.E.S.** Sari : Mazandaran State University, 2014. 2nd International Conference on Economy in Sanctions situation.
7. *The impact of currency exchange rate on Iranian non-oil export to the central Asia based on economic sanction situtaion.* **Teymoori, Isazadeh Rosshan, Yadollah Zadeh Tabari.** Sari : Mazandaran State Univeristy, 2013. International conference on Economy in Sanction Situations.
8. **Taylor, Adam.** 13 times that economic sanctions really worked. *The Washington Post.* [Online] April 28, 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/04/28/13-times-that-economic-sanctions-really-worked/>.
9. **Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Barbara Oegg.** *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition.* s.l. : Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007.

10. **Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg.** *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition.* s.l. : Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007. 978-0-88132-407-5 .
11. *Bilateral trade and the third party effect of US sanctions.* **Peksen, D.** Midwest : Annual meeting of international Studies Association, 2006.
12. *The impact of international Economic sanction on Trad an emprical analysis: An Emprical Analysis.* **Caruso, R.** Milan : Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano, 2003, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 9 (2), pp. 1-34.
13. *Investing the effect of security council comprehensive sanctions on Iran's regional linteграtion Withmembers of Eco and D8 Blocs.* **Akbarifard, H. Alaei, R. and Jalali, O.** s.l. : Indian Journal of Scientific Research, 2010, Vol. 4 (6), pp. 440-449.
14. *Examine the sanction's Efficiency on Iran's non-oil Trade (Gravity Model).* **Hadinejad, M. Mohamadi, T. and Shearkhani, S.** s.l. : Social Science Research Network, 2010, Social Science Electronic Publishing.
15. *The analysis of economic sanctions on Iranian international trade, using Gravity Method.* **Ziaei Bigdeli F., Gholami M., Tahmasebi E.** s.l. : پژوهش نامه اقتصادی (ایرانی - رویکرد اسلامی), 2013, Journal of Economical Research, Iran-Islam Approach, Vol. 5, pp. 109-119.
16. *The analysis of the impact of sanctions on Iran product exports.* **Kahzareh S., Nikpour N.** Sari : Mazandaran State University, 2014. 2nd International Conference on Economic in Sanction situation.
17. *The Health impact of Economic Sanction on health and well-being.* **Garfield, Richard, Julia Devin & Joy Fausey.** 2, New York : Overseas Development Institute, 1999, Relief and Rehabilitation Network (RRN), Vol. 72.
18. *Sanction experience and sanction behavior: an analysis of Chinese perception and behavior on economic sanctions.* **Tong Zhao.** No. 3, s.l. : Contemporary Politics , 2010, Vol. Vol. 16, pp. 263–278.
19. **Weiss, T.G., et al., eds.** *Political gain and civilian pain: humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions.* Lanham : MD: Rowman & Littlefield., 1997.
20. **Eriksson, M.** *Targeting peace: understanding UN and EU targeted sanctions.* Farnham : Ashgate, 2010.
22. *Why Do Sanctions Need Time to Work?, Adjustment, Learning and Anticipation.* **van Bergeijk, P A G and C van Marrewijk.** 2, s.l. : Economic Modelling, 1995, Vol. 12, pp. 75–86.

Biography

Syed Amir Hossein Alavifar is a PhD candidate in oil and gas economics in Moscow State University of Service and Tourism and a board member of BSTech Engineering consulting Co. He earned B.S in Industrial Engineering from Azad Islamic University of Tehran, Iran, Master in Engineering Management from University Putra Malaysia in field of operational risk management, He also earned certificate of Certified Risk and compliance Management Professional (CRCMP) from International Association of Risk and Compliance Professionals (IARCP), Washington DC, USA. Alavifar has completed several research projects in Urban Risk and Crisis Management with Iranian Governmental Sections. His research interests include risk assessment, risk management, crisis management, maintenance, project management, Security and Safety.