Public-Private Partnership in the Provision of Street Lighting Equipment in Bandung City

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Abstract

As of 2018, Bandung city has approximately 28,000 Street Lighting Equipment (SLE). Government constraints in providing funds to optimize SLE lead to limited government ability to optimize SLE. However, with the opening of the tap of the private sector's involvement policy in managing SLE infrastructure, there is the potential to optimize SLE. The problem in implementing the SLE PPP project is determining a suitable PPP scheme for providing SLE in Bandung. The obstacles include investment development schemes, the SLE database, and weak coordination between stakeholders. This research uses a qualitative approach. Determining the object of the study is carried out utilizing purposeful samples. While data collection techniques by performing observation, interview, documentation tracing, and audiovisual. Test reliability and validity using triangulation techniques. The resulting research concluded that the provision of SLE in the city of Bandung is to involve business entities in designing, building, financing, operating, and maintaining SLE infrastructure assets which will later become investments of the Bandung City Government. Alternatively, in other words, the PPP scheme suitable for the provision of SLE Bandung City is to use the Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM) type using the available payment return mechanism.

Keywords: Public-Private Partnership, Street Lighting Equipment, Availability Payment, Bandung, DBOM

1. Introduction

As mandated in Paris Agreement Article 4.19, Indonesia formulated a long-term strategy for managing low greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The Government of Indonesia is committed to reducing voluntary greenhouse gas emissions by 26% until 2020, then increasing to 29% from 2020 – to 2030 and a reduction of 41% for Conditional Reduction in the Business as Usual scenario (BAPPENAS 2017; Kurniadi & Suryadi 2021). One infrastructure supporting emission reduction and energy conservation programs is the Street heating Equipment (SLE). SLE energy conservation is carried out by increasing energy use efficiency and saving 20% of electric power (BAPPENAS, 2019; Sihombing, Santos, & Wibowo, 2021).

SLE energy conservation infrastructure can collaborate with the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scheme (Delmon, 2011). In SLE, steps that can be taken to improve energy efficiency use include using

energy-efficient lamps, metering (kWh meters), and intelligent lighting systems as an overall SLE status setting and control (Syarafina & Gunarta 2020). Under Regulation of the Minister of Transportation Number 27 of 2018, the lights used in SLE infrastructure at least use a Light Emitting Diode (LED), high-Pressure is charge Lamp, or Low-Pressure Discharge (Pranasari & Ferza 2018). Light bulbs are widely used in some areas, including the city of Bandung, causing electricity consumption to be high (Kurniadi & Suryadi, 2021). In addition, LED lights with dimming capabilities can reduce power usage by up to 50% without sacrificing much of the level of light produced (compared to High-Intensity Discharge lamps). Dimming helps minimize power consumption at certain times, such as midnight, when community activities begin to decrease (Wilhelm, 2009).

Met erization is used to replace the subscription system still used by some light points. Met erization will provide a more precise measurement of the electricity consumption of each lamp unit/pole. Size using met erization can be supported by installing an intelligent lighting system. The interconnection carried out by this system will provide centralized support to control and regulate several indicators, such as solid lighting settings. It recorded electrical power consumption or kilowatt-hour (kWh) meters (in conjunction with met erization), monitored the performance of electronic devices, and centralized remote control. It censored and recorded data on environmental conditions and monitored damage or failure of SLE (DPU Kota Bandung 2002). One thing to note is that in the Regulation of the Minister of Transportation Number 27 of 2018. it is stated that intelligent lighting system applications must be in the form of open-source applications and do not need to use specific software to access it so that integration will be easy.

To meet the SLE's target, we will need USD 359.2 billion in infrastructure investment, and only 73.5% of the investment value will be delivered through State Budget and State-owned Enterprises projects (BAPPENAS 2019). When the infrastructure is weak, the economy runs highly inefficiently such to high logistics costs. Businesses lack competitiveness (because the prices of doing business are high). Furthermore, a high degree of social injustice exists when it is challenging to reach healthcare facilities or for children to run a school. Infrastructure development and macroeconomic development go hand in hand because infrastructure development gives rise to economic expansion through the multiplier effect. In contrast, economic growth increases the need to enlarge existing infrastructure and the flow of goods and people that travel across the economy. When existing infrastructure cannot drink rising economic activity (and new infrastructure is not enough developed), arteries in the human body cause life-causing eating conditions (Darmawan, 2018).

Likewise, the Bandung City Government projects infrastructure needs through a PPP scheme of Rp 60 trillion. To support socio-economic activities and realize sustainable development, the City of Bandung needs to overcome the issue of the financing gap. Band City's government budget is minimal, Rp 7.42 trillion per year, so development financing innovation is required. The strategy was formulated to reduce the financing gap by developing a government non-budget financing collaboration scheme (Kurniadi & Suryadi, 2021).

As a Metropolitan City, Bandung has 37,592 SLE. Based on calculations using Indonesian National Standard Number 7391 of 2008, an additional 36,664 SLE is needed to have a total electricity requirement of 9.18 MW. When replaced with LED lights, the full electrical power will be reduced to 4.8 MW. The cost of electricity for SLE exists before returning LEDs of Rp 27.5 billion per year. After using LEDs, the amount becomes Rp 16 billion per year. So that the City of Bandung can save the budget for operations of Rp 11. 5 billion per year (DPU Kota Bandung 2002).

Meanwhile, in the PPP scheme, construction costs and operating costs are not borne by PJPK because these costs are the responsibility of the Implementing Business Entity. Ppp scheme provides an alternative for PJPK, which has limited finances to build SLE infrastructure. PPP schemes in SLE projects will provide several advantages compared to CGP schemes. (Figure 1). In addition to providing alternative project procurement, the PPP scheme will provide value for money (VfM), which is of positive importance to the CGP scheme with reduced costs for the government. Such as saving electricity usage (because the project is completed faster) and efficiency over operating and maintenance costs. In addition, PPP schemes allow the transfer of risk to private parties (Implementing Business Entities) so that the appropriate parties can manage risks (Asian Development Bank 2018; BAPPENAS 2019).




Figure 1. PPP Mechanism in the Provision of Street Lighting Equipment

1.1 Objectives

The problem in implementing the SLE PPP project is determining a suitable PPP scheme for providing SLE in Bandung. The obstacles include investment development schemes, the SLE database, and weak coordination between stakeholders.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Public-Privat Partnership

PPP is a form of government cooperation with business entities in the provision of infrastructure for the public interest by referring to the specifications that have been set before. The Minister/Head of Institutions/Heads of Regions/State-Owned Enterprises/Regional Owned Enterprises partially or wholly uses the resources of business entities concerning risk sharing between the parties (BAPPENAS 2019). This cooperation scheme will bring added value to both parties where development can be accelerated and function as expected to get further economic benefits (Roberts, Lindfield, & Steinberg 2018).

PPP has four characteristics, namely: (1) PPP is a long-term contract; (2) Private investment and project life cycle are essential for the private sector; (3) Innovation in the provision of services carried out by private parties; and (4) There are benefits obtained both from the private sector and from the government (Donahue & Zeckhauser 2011).

Several variants of PPP definitions, including (1) PPP as a management reform in which governance and bureaucratic functions are integrated with professional management; (2) PPP is the cooperation of institutions from the public sector and private sector to achieve specific targets where both parties accept investment risk based on the division of profits and costs they bear; and (3) PPP is a cooperation between government and private sector that produces a product or service in which risks, costs, and benefits are borne together based on the added value it creates (Grimsey & Lewis 2004).

PPP must be seen within the overall context of the public sector. The public sector encourages:(1) Decentralization; (2) Separating responsibility for the purchase of public services from that of their provision; (3) Output or performance-based measurements of public services; (4) Contracting out public services to the private sector; and (5) Privatization of public service (Yescombe and Farquharson 2018). Defines PPP as the agreement between a public entity and a private party, under which: a) the private party undertakes government function for a specific period, b) the private party receives compensation for performing the function, directly or indirectly, c) the private party is liable for the

risk arising from performing the function, and d) the public facilities, land or other resources may be transferred to the private party (Wilhelm, 2009; Calabrese, 2008).

Still related to the discussion on the meaning of PPP, Savas (2000) and Boussabaine (2013) explains it as follows: With Public-Private Partnerships, infrastructure projects are increasingly being built. However, it is not like in general terms in PPP terminology. The government or the state requires intensive capital to create a durable infrastructure using a combination contract model. Namely, Infrastructure facilities financed mainly by the private sector are then operated by private entities under a franchise with long-term contracts or leases. For twenty or 99 years, the development includes development, operation, maintenance, and capital costs. The PPP model is usually characterized by constructing roads, bridges age, drinking water projects, pipelines, and electricity generation. However, in its development, the construction of prisons, stadiums, the schools sold, and city development is also built through this method, such as urban economic development projects.

It can be concluded that PPP is the involvement of private parties in their cooperation with the government to take care of the public interest. The form of the association carried out is the cooperation in a mutually agreed contract. In theory, the core of PPP is the continuous interrelationship/synergy (long-term cooperation contract) in the development of projects to improve public services between (1) Government or local government as a regulator; (2) Banking/consortium as funder; and (3) Private Parties as Special Purpose Company responsible for the implementation of a project ranging from design, construction, maintenance, and operations (Dedic. Public-Private Partnersh. Units 2010).

According to Hua (2009) and Vladimir (2011), the reason for cooperation with the private sector in public services is because the inefficiency and incompetence of the government are the results of monopolization in the field of public services.

For this PPP to succeed, according to Noel and Brzeski (2005), it is necessary to pay attention to the following: (1) This cooperation must be strategically important for both parties; (2) This cooperation is complementary rather than complementary; (3) Disclosure of information on both parties; (4) This cooperation should cause a proper integration link even though it is different cultures. Mutual trust is the main thing, and (5) The arrangement must be institutionally able to demonstrate a clear identity and position.

2.2 PPP Financing Type

The type of PPP financing is divided into two types, namely (1) Solicited projects and 2) Unsolicited projects (Roberts, Lindfield, and Steinberg 2018; BAPPENAS 2019; Akbiyikli and Eaton 2005). The Solicited cycle consists of four stages, namely planning, project preparation, transactions, and contract management. Unsolicited project is an infrastructure project initiated by a business entity where the proposal submitted by the business entity must meet the requirements of conformity with the sector master plan and economic and financial feasibility. The business entity has adequate financial capabilities to finance the implementation of the initiated project.

2.3 PPP Funding Sources

2.3.1 User Charge

A user charge scheme is a scheme in a PPP project in which the project gets funding and return on investment derived from levies on user usage of services provided by business entities. Infrastructure projects that are usually implemented using user charge schemes are projects that can more easily generate revenue (revenue), including because of high user estimates so that private business entities can manage demand risk.

2.3.2 Availability Payment


An availability payment scheme is a scheme in PPP projects where the return on investment of business entities comes from periodic payments made by the government to business entities based on the availability of infrastructure services.

2.4 PPP Collaboration Forms

The PPP project scheme must reflect the allocation of risk, the person in charge of financing, and the status of cooperation asset management. The forms of cooperation are broad as follows: (Figure 2).



Source: Dikun, KPBU Lecturer, (2010)



3. Research Methodology

This research uses a qualitative approach. The strategy that will be applied in this research is a case study. Determining objects is done intentionally (purposefully), not randomly, to collect the desired data. (Table 1)

No	Sources of Information	Report	Key Informant
1	Head of Public Works Office		V
2.	Head of DPMPTSP	V	
3.	Head of Bepelting	V	
4.	Head of UPT KPBU Bepelting		V
5.	Head of Investment	V	
6.	Head of Planning DPU		V
7.	Bandung City DPRD	V	
8.	Mayor of Bandung		V
9.	Bandung City Secretary		V
10.	Community Leaders	V	

Table 1. Key Informants and Informants

4. Data Collection Techniques

Data collection strategies include Observation, Interview, Documentation, and Audiovisual material. According to Creswell (2008), eight procedures are often applied in qualitative research, namely: 1) triangulation; 2) members checking; 3) creating solid description; 4) clarifying cases; presenting different (negative) information; 6) using a long time; 7) conducting Q&A with colleagues, and 8) invite an outside auditor.

5. Result and Discussion

5.1 Description of SLE Bandung City

SLE in Bandung city is spread on existing roads with several types of SLE, but on the other hand, there are still roads that do not have SLE, especially environmental roads. The main street in Bandung City already has SLE, both single-arm SLE and double arm SLE. The construction and repair of SLE in 2010 reached 351 SLE points built on protocol roads and housing spread across the city of Bandung. SLE was built in 2011, as many as 480 SLE, and in 2012 made, as many as 300 SLE. SLE development from 2010 to 2012 amounted to 1,131 points. In 2018 there were an additional 26,793 SLE points, bringing the total SLE in Bandung City u018 to 27,924 units spread across six development areas. (Tables 2 - 4)

No	Region	SLE Type						
		Standard SLE	SLE	Sum				
			Environment					
1	Cibeunying	4,548	1,572	6,120				

Table 2.	Total SLE Until 2018
1 4010 2.	

2	Bojonegara	3,880	853	4,733	
3	Karees	3,087	1,027	4,114	
4	Tegalega	3,450	1,325	4,775	
5	Ujungberung	2,518	1,600	4,118	
6	Gedebage	3,228	836	4,064	
Sum		20,711	7,213	27,924	

Source: DPU Kota Bandung, 2018

Many streets in the city of Bandung are still many who do not have SLE. The latest data shows that the road segments already have SLE; 1,532 roads, and roads that do not have SLE reach 1,410 roads. While the road segments already have environmental SLE, as many as 565 streets and roads do not have environmental SLE get 1,051. Most roads that do not yet have SLE are main roads for secondary local roads and neighborhood roads, either in residential areas or villages. (Table 2)

Table 3. Availability of SLE per Street Section in 2018

No	Region	Number of Roads	Ada SLE	Tidak Ada SLE
1	Cibeunying	467	311	156
2	Bojonegara	546	425	121
3	Karees	702	244	458
4	Tegalega	402	150	252
5	Ujungberung	463	205	258
6	Gedebage	362	197	165
Sum		2,942	1,532	1,410

Source: DPU Kota Bandung, 2018

The availability of Environmental SLE per street segment in Bandung City in 2018 is seen below.

No	Region	Number of	SLE	No Environmental	
		Neighborhood Streets	Environment	SLE	
1	Cibeunying	225	113	112	
2	Bojonegara	148	57	91	
3	Karees	446	93	353	
4	Tegalega	195	115	80	
5	Ujungberung	195	119	76	
6	Gedebage	407	68	339	
Sum		1,616	565	1,051	

Table 4. Availability of Environmental SLE in 2018

Source: DPU Kota Bandung, 2018

The types and types of SLE lamps that are widely used in the city of Bandung today are:

- SON lights are widely used in several Bandung City SLEs, such as SLE on Jalan Aceh, Jalan Ambon, Jalan Asep Berlian, Jalan Banceuy, Jalan Katamso, Jalan Antapani, Jalan Arcamanik, Jalan Cicendo, Jalan Cipaganti, Jalan Batununggal, Jalan Ciwastra, Jalan Bumi Penyileukan, Jalan Jupiter, Jalan Kawaluyaan, Jalan Kiaracondong, Jalan Braga, Jalan Cihapit, Jalan Cikaso, Jalan Diponegoro, Jalan Citarum, Jalan Venus Barat and many other roads.
- 2. Environmental SLE lights are widely used on Jalan Cibunut Dalam, Jalan Kebon Pisang, Jalan Muararajeun Kidul, and several other roads.
- 3. LHE lights are widely used on Jalan Alkateri, Jalan Bengawan, Jalan Nanas, Jalan Sersan Bajuri, Jalan Sawah Kurung, Jalan Banten, Jalan Karawitan, Jalan Taruna Baru, Jalan Guruminda, Jalan Cisaranten Wetan, Jalan Baturaden and several other roads.
- 4. HPL lights are widely used in several streets in Bandung City such as Jalan Anta Baru, Jalan Mars Raya, Jalan Margahayu Raya Barat, Jalan Riung Saluyu, Jalan Samarinda, Jalan B maldives, Jalan Sederhana, Jalan Kanayakan, Jalan Sekeloa Utara, Jalan Batik Kumeli, Jalan Cisitu Baru, Jalan Cipaku, Jalan Tubagus Ismail, Jalan Sekeloa, Jalan Dr Hatta and several other roads.

5.2 SLE Financial Feasibility Analysis

The financial ability of the Bandung City Government to run the SLE Program is far from the ideal number. The investment needs for the Bandung City SLE Program mentioned the total estimated investment of SLE of Rp 1.5 trillion (scenario 1). (Table 5)

Scenario	1	2	3	4
Investment Scope				
Lamp	207.409.273.761	207.409.273.761	207.409.273.761	207.409.273.761
Replacement				
Pole Replacement	104.103.379.710	104.103.379.710	104.103.379.710	-
Cable	251.180.380.472	251.180.380.472	-	-
Replacement				
Construction of a	184.707.527.312	-	-	-
New PJU				
Construction of a	199.116.700.002	-	-	-
New Pole				
New Cabling	387.830.639.406	-	-	-
Smart PJU	168.806.400.000	91.196.800.000	91.196.800.000	91.196.800.000
Total Estimated	1.503.154.300.663	653.889.833.943	402.709.453.471	298.606.073.761
Investment (Rp)				
Number of PJU	52.752	28.499	28.499	28.499
Installed				
Estimated Annual	271.250.000.000		78.750.000.000	61.250.000.000
Income Needs (Rp)				
Percentage of	155%	73%	45%	35%
Revenue Needs				
from PPJ				
Smart PJU Energy	30%	30%	30%	30%
Saving				
Estimated Annual	1%	1%	1%	1%
O&M Cost				
(Percentage of				
Capex)				
Period	-	-		
Construction	2	2	2	2
(Year)				
Operational (Year)	18	18	18	18
Investment				
Feasibility				
NPV (Rp)	375.780.209.509	140.719.854.315	81.616.651.507	61.768.156.752
IRR	15%	15%	15%	15%
Payback Period	10	8	8	8
(Year)				

Table 5. FS Analysis

5.3 Risk analysis in PPP-SLE

Risk analysis may arise, and mitigation plans can be implemented if these risks occur. The following is a matrix of risk allocation in PPP SLE Bandung City. (Table 6)

No		Risk	Description	City	Enter	Toget	Mitigation	Specific
110		Categories	Description	Gove	prises	her	Strategies	Conditions
		and Events		rnme	•		According to Best	Related to Risk
				nt			Practice	Allocation
Ι		LAND RISK					ſ	
	1	Land	Failure of project land	Х			Land legal status	The government
	•	cannot be	acquisition due to the				and transparent	owns the condition
		liberated.	problematic land				procedures in	of the land
			acquisition process				project land acquisition	because it uses the RUMIJA area
	2	The	Delays and increases in	X			Good	Relocation of
		process of	costs due to the	21			communication with	existing PJU that
		relocating	complexity of the				affected parties	uses poles
		existing	utility transfer process				1	belonging to other
		activities	issue					parties (PLN and
								others) and risks
								related to existing
							~ ^	utilities affected
	3	Land status	The status of PJU land	Х			Support from	The government
	·	risk	locations in conflict with the community				relevant authorities (BPN, DPKAD,	should own land status because of
			with the community				DPU, Dishub, local	RUMIJA.
							regional apparat	KOMIJA.
	4	Difficulty	Delay due to		Х		Historical data on	Potential
		in	uncertainty of location				land use and soil	geotechnical risk
		unexpected	conditions				investigation, and	due to earthquake
		location					safe structure design	area
	_	conditions					~	
	5	Limitations of	Related to the provision		Х		Good construction methods	If there is a public
	•	workspace	of land for workspace during the construction				methods	rejection, the government can
		workspace	period					help.
	6	Constructio	r		Х		Socialization by the	
		n working					Government	
		space						
	7	Damage to			Х		Historical data on	Unrelated to
	•	artifacts					land use and land	artifacts and
		and ancient					investigation	antiquities at the
		items at the site						site
Π			Construction, And Opera	tion Tes	t			
	1	The	Delays and increased			X	Clarification during	PJPK output
	1.	vagueness	costs due to unclear				the tender process	specification refers
	1	of output	output specifications				Good design	to best practice
	1	specificatio					capacity	-
	-	ns						
	2	Design	Cause extra/revision of		Х		Experienced and	They are usually
	·	errors	the design requested by				good design	identified during
			the manager				consultant	technical operation tests.
	3	Late	May include the late		X		Reliable contractors	The project goes
	ĺ.	completion	return of location				and standard	off schedule.
		of	access.				contractual clauses	
		constructio						
		n						

No		Risk Categories and Events	Description	City Gove rnme nt	Enter prises	Toget her	Mitigation Strategies According to Best Practice	Specific Conditions Related to Risk Allocation
	4	Operating test risk	Estimated time/cost errors in technical operation tests		Х		Good coordination of contractors and operators	The operational test is not as expected / not by the original design
III		Risk Sponso	r		•	r		1
	1	Poor subcontract or performanc e			X		Credible subcontractor selection process	
	2	Default subcontract or			X		Credible subcontractor selection process	
	3.	Default BU	Default BU leading to termination/step-in by financier		X		Consortium backed by credible and solid sponsors.	
	4	Project sponsorshi p default	Default sponsor (or consortium member)		X		PQ process to obtain credible sponsors.	
IV		Financial Ri				r		1
	1	Failure to achieve financial close	They are not achieving financial close due to uncertainty of market conditions.		Х		Good coordination with potential lenders	It could also be because the condition's precedence is not met.
	2	Financial structure risk	Inefficiency due to the project's capital structure that is not optimal		Х		Consortium backed by credible sponsors/lenders.	
	3.	Currency exchange rate risk	Fluctuations (non- extreme) exchange rates		Х		Instrument protect value; financing in rupiah.	Can be discussed again with the government if the fluctuations are extreme
	4	Inflation rate risk	Increase (non-extreme) inflation rate against assumptions in life cycle cost		Х		Factor indeksasi tariff	Can be discussed again with the government if the fluctuations are extreme
	5	Interest rate risk	Fluctuations (non- extreme) interest rates		Х		Binga rate hedging	
	6	Insurance risk (1)	Insurance coverage for certain risks is no longer available on the market.		Х		Consulting with insurance specialists/brokers	Especially for the scope of risks related to force majeure
	7	Insurance risks (2)	Substantial increase in premium rate to an initial estimate		Х		Consulting with insurance specialists/brokers	
V	-	Operation R	isk	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		37		
	1.	Electricity availabilit y				Х	The City Government encourages PLN to guarantee the availability of lyrics.	

No	Risk Categories and Events	Description	City Gove rnme nt	Enter prises	Toget her	Mitigation Strategies According to Best Practice	Specific Conditions Related to Risk Allocation
2.	Availabilit y of facilities	Because the facility cannot be built		Х		Reliable contractor	
3.	Poor or unavailabi lity of service	As a result, the facility cannot operate	X	Х		Reliable operator; precise output specifications; mutual check between the city and BU	Service is not available due to problems with lights, cables or poles. If the problem is in the Lamp, then it is the responsibility of BU, but if the cable and pole are the responsibility of the City Government.
4.	Industrial action	Strike action, work ban.		Х		Hr policy and good industrial relations	Can be by managing staff, subcontractors, or suppliers
5.	Local Social and cultural risks	Risks arising from not taking into account the culture or social conditions of the local community in the implementation of the project		Х		Implementing community development programs that are people-oriented; community empowerment	
6.	Project manageme nt failure	Failure or inability of Business Entities to manage cooperation project operations		Х		Draw up an operations management plan and execute it professionally	
7.	Project control and monitorin g failure	The occurrence of undetectable deviations due to failure of control and monitoring by Business Entities or PPJK			Х	Prepare a control and monitoring plan and periodic evaluation of the design and implementation effectiveness.	
8.	O&M cost hikes	Due to O&M cost estimation errors or unexpected increases		Х		Reliable operator; escalation factors in the contract	
9.	Life cycle cost estimation was an error.			Х		Deal/contract with seawall supplier possible	
1 0 VI	Traffic accidents or safety issues Income Risk			Х		Third-party liability insurance	

No		Risk	Description	City	Enter	Toget	Mitigation	Specific
		Categories	•	Gove	prises	her	Strategies	Conditions
		and Events	-	rnme nt			According to Best Practice	Related to Risk Allocation
	1	Revenue	Etimasi income		Х		Making an MOU /	When triggered by
	•	estimated errors from	earned from Street Lighting Tax				agreement between PLN, The City	Government action, a minimum
		the initial	Lighting Tax				Government, and	income guarantee
		model					BU	can be considered.
	2	The local	Due to user			Х	Guarantee by the	The local
	•	government	affordability and				Central Government	government
		cannot afford to pay	willingness below the eligibility level				and other institutions such as	cannot allocate PPJ under the
		to pay	englomity level				PII; Agreement with	agreement.
	3	Failure to	Due to failure / non-		Х		A tripartite	
	•	collect tariff	optimal rate				agreement between	
		payments	collection system				The City Government, PLN,	
							and BU	
	4	Late PPJ	PPJ receipt from PLN	Х			A tripartite	
	•	admission	is late				agreement between	
		adjustment					The City Government, PLN,	
							and BU	
	5	PPJ	PPJ receipts declined	Х			Good operating	
	•	acceptance	not as initially				performance;	
		rate lower than	planned				regulations that support	
		projected					support	
	6	Miscalculatio			Х		Survey user	
	•	n of estimated					affordability and	
		tariffs					willingness yang handal	
VII		Network Conn	ectivity Risks			1	nandar	
	1	Network risk	Disavow the City	Х			Good understanding	
	•		Government's				of contracts by the	
			promise not to build competing facilities				City Government	
VI		Interface Risk	competing facilities					
II			Γ				Γ	Γ
	1	Interface Risk	Inequality in the			Х	Repair work by	
	•	(1)	quality of government support				parties whose work quality is lower	
			work and what BU				quality 15 10 WOI	
			does					
	2	Interface Risk	Substantial rework		Х		Agreement of the	
	•	(2)	related to differences in standards/service				parties as early as possible on the	
			methods used.				standards/methods	
							to be applied	
IX	1	Risk Policy	E	v			Demosti C	
	1	Foreign currency	Foreign currency is not available.	Х			- Domestic financing - Offshore financing	
	· ·	cannot be	Or cannot be				accounts	
		converted.	converted from				-Guarantee of the	
			rupiah				central banks	
	2	Foreign	Foreign currency	Х			-Domestic financing	
	•	currency	cannot be transferred					

No		Risk	Description	City	Enter	Toget	Mitigation	Specific
110		Categories	Description	Gove	prises	her	Strategies	Conditions
		and Events		rnme	prises	псі	According to Best	Related to Risk
				nt			Practice	Allocation
		cannot be	to the investor's home	ш			-Offshore financing	Anocation
		repatriated.	country				accounts	
		Tepatratea.	country				-Guarantee of the	
							central banks	
	3	Risk	Nationalization/takeo	X			- Mediation,	
	5	ekspropriasi	ver with	Λ			negotiation	
	•	CKSpropriasi	compensation				- Political Risk	
			(adequate)				Insurance	
			(aucquate)				-Government	
							Guarantee	
	4	Common	It can be considered a		Х		Guarantee	
		regulatory	business risk.		Λ			
	•	(and tax)	ousiness risk.					
		changes						
	5	Discriminator	In the form of tax	Х			-Mediation,	In addition to
		y and specific	policy by the relevant				negotiation	having an explicit
	-	regulatory	authorities (central or				- Political Risk	contractual
		(and tax)	regional)				Insurance	provision,
		changes					-Government	including
		enunger					Guarantee	compensation
	6	Delay in	Only if triggered by	Х			-Explicit provision	
		obtaining	unilateral/unnatural				of the contract,	
		planning	decisions from the				including its	
		approvals	relevant authorities				compensation	
	7	Failure/delay	Hany if triggered by	Х			- Explicit provision	Usually related to
		in approval	unilateral/unnatural				of the contract,	issues other than
		11	decisions from the				including its	planning
			relevant authorities				compensation	1 0
X		Risks of Force	Majeure				•	
	1	Natural				Х	Insurance, whenever	
		Disasters					possible	
	2	Force	Events of war, riots,			Х	Insurance, whenever	
		majeure	disturbances of				possible	
		politis	public security					
	3	Extreme				Х	Insurance, whenever	
		weather					possible	
	4	Force	If it is above 6-12			Х	Each party may	Especially when
		majeure	months, it can				terminate the PPP	insurance is not
		berkepanjang	interfere with the				contract and trigger	available for
		an	economic aspects of				early termination	specific risks.
			the affected party					
			(especially bias					
			insurance does not					
			exist)					
XI		Asset Ownership Risk						
	1	Risk of	Fire or explosion.		Х		Insurance	
	•	falling asset						
		value						

5.4 Alternative Cooperation Scheme

The cooperation scheme that will be carried out in Bandung city SLE involves private parties to build, care for, and empower/utilize the SLE area, which will later become an investment of the Bandung City government. The mechanism that can be used under the conditions and character of this SLE

project is the Availability Payment mechanism. By the Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Nomor 190/PMK.08/2015, the Availability Payment mechanism can be implemented for PPP projects that meet the following criteria:

- a. For the provision of economic infrastructure and the provision of social infrastructure that has great benefits for the community as service users.
- b. For the provision of infrastructure as intended in paragraph a, whose return on investment is not obtained from payment by service users to Business Entities; and
- c. For PPP with the procurement of Business Entities is conducted through fair, open, and transparent election stages and pays attention to healthy business competition.

Based on these criteria, the SLE project will be suitable for implementation through the Availability Payment mechanism because payments by users are made through SLE taxes paid not to Business Entities but through electricity bills.

Cooperation with Business Entities is one of the financing models that can be developed. The cooperation model between local governments and private parties is known as PPP. This model is widely used because of the limited investment capital owned by the government. At the same time, infrastructure needs become a basic need that is urgent and needs to be rushed to create increased economic growth and community welfare.

In collaborating with business entities, several things need to be considered, namely:

- 1) Referring to applicable procurement regulations of goods/services
- 2) Pay attention to the procurement of SLE goods/services
 - a. Ensuring the credibility of procurement participants, both the completeness and validity of administrative documents.
 - b. Technical specifications must be clear, detailed, measurable, and verifiable.
 - c. SLE equipment guarantee in the form of clear supporting documents.
 - d. Quality supervision and control mechanisms with third parties or internal staff.
 - e. Warranty and maintenance period as a backup for the certification of system conformity/components promised by the provider of the goods.
 - f. The optimum results and packaging work should be in one work package, namely equipment procurement and installation.
 - g. E-Catalog

In addition to SLE construction, operations and maintenance will also cooperate with business entities. Here are the points of the SLE maintenance mechanism with business entities:

- 1) SLE managers must have detailed data/information about the SLE system, including:
 - a. Predicting the replacement of SLE light ballast
 - b. Set an SLE maintenance schedule
 - c. Open communication media between managers and the community so that SLE complaints will be appropriately handled soon.
 - d. Create a reporting mechanism / SOP for follow-up community complaints.

6. Conclusion

Based on the above research results, it was concluded that the provision of SLE in the City of Bandung is to involve business entities to design, build, finance, operate, and maintain SLE infrastructure assets, which will later become investments in the Bandung City Government. Alternatively, in other words, the PPP scheme that is suitable for the provision of SLE Bandung City is to use the DBOM (Design-Build-Operate-Maintain) type using the availability payment (AP) return on investment mechanism.

SLE infrastructure is one of the essential infrastructures for developing an area. Good lighting by SLE will certainly increase economic flows in the area because economic activity is hardly limited by the time possible. After all, the road can be adequately illuminated, and good visibility on the environment and roads reduces the risk of crime and accidents. With the explanation above, the challenges that can arise in SLE infrastructure projects can be adequately managed so that the project can run efficiently, both from the time and resources needed.

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