

# **Political Alms: Patronage Practices in the 2019 Legislative Election in South Sumatra**

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## **Abstract**

Patronage has become more massive since the change in the electoral system to open proportionality. This article discusses variations in the practice of political patronage incumbents and new legislative candidates for the 2019 General Election from the perspective of political sociology. Data was collected by using candidate shadowing techniques, interviews with legislative candidates, success teams and voters. Primary-secondary data were analyzed and then interpreted qualitatively in depth. The results of the study indicate a tendency to shift from active legislative candidates to voters through brokers or successful teams. Giving to voters is interpreted as a political charity, goods are positioned as symbols of attention and service as a bonus. Contribution of research in the context of patronage variations and the concept of political alms, active voters. In addition, the strategy of sharing votes in one family, if receiving money from several candidates. The factor of the amount of money, proximity to the candidate becomes the basis of choice. So that the practice of patronage does not guarantee the electability of candidates. Political patronage has broad implications, apart from damaging the image of democracy, it also fosters the practice of money politics and corruption.

## **Keywords**

Patronage, Candidates, Giving, and Voters.

## **1. Introduction**

The reformation era is expected to give birth to a government that is free from corrupt practices through democratic elections. However, from the 1999 to 2019 elections, they have not been able to present legislative members who are free from political corruption practices. The failure of substantive democratic practices, not only because of the morality problem of politicians and voters, but also by an open proportional electoral system (open list). This system has opened up opportunities for fierce and even brutal contestation between candidates. Opportunities for candidate electability are no longer based on the acquisition of party votes, but more importantly the votes acquired by each candidate. In addition, the political practices of the reform era are also marked by the image of politicians (Piliang, 2011, Mujani et al, 2010 and Taqwa, 2013).

The open proportional electoral system has consequences for the contestation between candidates. Previously, there were competitors between parties, not between parties but also between candidates, both candidates between parties and between candidates in the same party. In addition to technical election problems which still leave many problems, there are also issues of political practice that nullify the spirit of democracy, namely transactional politics which are almost evenly carried out by legislative candidates, both at the district and national levels. Knowing the patronage practices and the amount of funds spent can be an indication of rampant post-election corruption practices. Political corruption motives for DPR (People's Representative Council) and DPRD (Regional People's Representative Assembly) members are to return the expensive costs incurred in the election (Riwanto, 2015: 89). By knowing the variations and how political patronage operations in the field can at least provide an overview of the rampant practices of political corruption after the legislative elections. So there are many political implications in the future, as the political impact of this money.

The above conditions have provided an open space for the practice of political patronage which has become a global phenomenon in developing countries. This is indeed a lot happening in countries where people are not yet mature in democracy, such as in the countries of the African continent (Bamidele and Titeca, 2006). People in developing democratic countries still hope to get instant and definite benefits, rather than long-term benefits that have not been guaranteed. The same is true of a number of cities in Latin American countries. Even the practice of political patronage has had a broad impact, the formation of socio-economic structures in society (Menes, 2019).

## **2. Literature Review**

According to Bamidele's (2017) study, patronage remains an important aspect of the country's political and economic power. Modern political institutions controlled by the elite gain power through the people. These developments place political elites in a position to grant privileges and concessions they see fit. Therefore, this gave birth to the creation of a clientelistic structure with the political elite as protector and a large part of the population as clients willing to give their loyalty to clients for the benefit of economic resources.

The intensity of patronage is a politician's strategy to gain political support for 3 rounds of the reform era elections, not only in the legislative elections, but also in the *Pemilukada*. Previous studies have shown this, such as the research of Ismanto & Taha, Paskarina, Rohi, Aswad, and Ibrahim (in Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2014). Likewise the research results from Riwanto (2015) which prove the correlation between open proportionality and political corruption, Pratama (2017) which shows the practice of patronage and clientelism in the post-conflict local election of Kendari City, Tawakkal (2019) which explains social networks and the role of brokers in elections in West Java. and Mietzner (2009) prove the high cost of election politics. According to Mietzner, (2009: 19) the system of determining elected candidates based on the most votes has made elections very expensive and created multi-complex problems. In fact, according to him, the result is that many of those elected will enter parliament with significant debt and are under pressure to pay it off quickly.

In general, party patronage can be understood as the use of public resources specifically and the direct exchange between clients and politicians (Müller, 2006, p. 189). Hence it is usually viewed as immoral, if not outright illegal. Therefore, most of the initial reports of patronage were generated under the assumption that patronage is a democratic pathology, which is characteristic of a non-functioning political system (Bearfield, 2009: 67; Boissevain, 1966; Eschenburg, 1961), which is why patronage studies are often focused in developing countries (Kopecký, 2011). Because of the perception of patronage as a crime, party political theorists are reluctant to admit that it is an inherent feature of party government. Because of the perception of patronage as a crime, party political theorists are reluctant to admit that it is an inherent feature of party government. However, as stated by Jean Blondel (2002: 240–5), party protection is one of several forms of relationship between the government and the parties that support it. As such, it represents a link in the network chain between voters, parties and the state apparatus (Müller, 2000b: 311–2), although this link is not usually seen as strengthening processes of representation or democratic accountability (Flinders, 2010). However, the idea of patronage as a linkage mechanism between parties and government opens up new theoretical perspectives on party patronage. In particular, this leads to the conclusion that a better understanding of party patronage can be developed once it is understood as a manifestation of party government.

Previous research has generally been at the national, regional or at the level district and city levels by Aspinall et al, (2014) and Pratama (2017). In grassroots research where voters have direct contact with candidates, there has also not been any variation in patronage, and how voters make choices at In the middle of the onslaught of giving money from legislative candidates. In the religious community, the use of religious terminology into political language will be explained in this research.

Patronage research at the national and regional levels is still limited, at the grassroots level, namely at the electoral level for the newly created district DPRD. The pattern of patronage politics is increasingly being used as a strategy for legislative candidates to get political support from voters. Therefore it is interesting to conduct a study on how the patronage pattern takes place, with whom politicians build patronage. When and how did the process take place, especially for communities that are in the process of becoming urban. This shows the high level of contestation between candidates, thus providing space for them to take advantage of various ways to get as many voters as possible, because the electoral system which adheres to an open proportional or open list.

There are 3 main problems that will be explained in this article, namely: 1) What are the variants of political patronage carried out by candidates, and the comparison between incumbent and non-incumbent candidates? 2) What is the community's strategy in dealing with political patronage, and 3) what are the implications for the future relations between politicians and constituents?

### **2.1. Conceptual Framework**

With reference to the concept of Shefter (2009) patronage is defined as a profit sharing among politicians to distribute something individually to voters, workers or campaigners, in order to get political support from them. Thus, patronage is the provision of cash, goods, services, and other economic benefits (such as employment, positions in organizations or government or project contracts) distributed by politicians, including profits destined for individuals (for example, envelopes filled with cash) and to the group / community (for example, a new soccer

field for youth). Patronage can also be in the form of cash or goods distributed to voters originating from private funds (for example, in vote buying or what is commonly known as money politics and vote buying) or public funds.

With reference to the above concept, in this research Patronage is defined as a political relationship that relies on money, goods or economic opportunities that are distributed to gain political support. Thus, patronage concerns the material provided by candidates to voters. The goal is to get political support from voters to candidates. This concept is also used by Aspinall, Sukmajati et al. (2014) on 2014 election research in 10 provinces in Indonesia. In addition, Pratama (2017) is also used in research on Pemilukada in Kendari. On that basis, this study uses the concepts of the two researchers, but at the grassroots level. The emphasis is on how various patronage practices vary at the community level and what are the strategies of voters in responding to patronage, and what are the implications for democracy at the local level.

Patronage practices have broad implications for democratic practices through elections, so that the results cannot find quality election processes and results. Elections are becoming increasingly expensive and the subsequent political process will not produce policies that are in line with the aspirations of the people. For example, Menes' research results. By using a theoretical "game" model, Menes (tt) tries to describe the negative impact of patronage politics in several cities in America. Menes' research results indicate that the ability to buy votes reduces election control by the government. Taxes, budgets, city wages and corruption are all predicted to rise under a patronage-based regime. But in a city, patronage politics do not loosen incentives to provide public goods. In addition, he also concluded that empirically, the city government which is dominated by political machines pays more city government employees and has a bigger budget but provides high-level public goods. This is one of the problems or implications of the practice of political patronage. The implication is that the quality of the election is poor, the citizens lose the opportunity to control their representatives in parliament.

The following will explain the methods, research results, understanding and discussion. Narrative of the results of in-depth interviews with informants, both from legislative candidates and the success team. Shows successful, failed, incumbent and new legislative candidates, the attitude of voters to respond to patronage and its future implications.

### **3. Methods**

This qualitative descriptive study (Bungin, 2012: 68) uses interview techniques and Candidate Shadowing (Amalinda, 2014) in collecting data. The technique of trailing successful candidates or teams is carried out for a certain duration. In addition, it is also equipped with documents in the form of pictures or foto. Data collection with special interviews was also carried out to support the completeness of data from the success teams of candidates directly in the field. The interviewed informants were selected on purpose who were seen as having the capacity of each of the successful teams. There are 6 candidate informants, and the success team consists of 10 people. Meanwhile, as many as 30 informants from the community as voters were chosen deliberately with a number of criteria, such as age and status.

The unit of analysis in this research is legislative candidates and success team (individuals) from several parties that are chosen deliberately. The results of data collection, both primary and secondary data, were then analyzed qualitatively, and then interpreted. The researcher does not intend to test the theory, but to describe the facts and reality in detail (thick description).

Patronage studies are generally from the political science and public administration side (Bearfield, 2009), therefore this study departs from the perspective of political sociology. With this perspective of political sociology, candidates, times and voters are positioned as political actors who negate their bargaining positions. In this context there is an exchange of resources, where voters receive goods or capital while candidates through times get voting support from the voters. So in this context there is an exchange of capital between the two parties. This direct or cash exchange has implications for the future, in which voters do not have "rights" or bargain to demand from elected council members their political rights in the form of public policies.

### **4. Results and Discussion: Political Patronage Practices**

This article describes the variation of political patronage practices by legislative candidate members in the 2019 elections, in Electoral District 1, Ogan Ilir Regency. First, it explains the variations in the patronage of money and goods carried out by legislative candidates to East Timor and the community, how the patronage patterns as a political strategy to gain power. Second, it is explained about the service patronage and business opportunities carried out by candidates such as job offers to the East Timorese and the people who voted for them and offers of public services and services to the East Timorese and the community. Almost all of them use money and goods,

but patronage does not guarantee that someone will be elected. Because there is a lot of money in circulation, voters in a family or household apply various voting strategies to candidates. There is so much money in circulation that voters find it difficult to choose one of the candidates, so there is a vote sharing strategy; and candidates must be willing to accept if they are not elected.

#### 4.1. Numerical Results

Table 1 shows that the largest nominal amount obtained by residents is IDR 100 thousand per person. That much money is safe enough to get votes if there are no rivals from other candidates. Most of them give money with the highest nominal value from incumbent candidates who already have a lot of capital. Like the WY and FA candidates, according to informants, both of them have given IDR 200 thousand for one vote, so that he won the most votes in electoral district 1. While EN, who is also an incumbent candidate, only gave IDR 100 thousand for one vote, eventually losing the election. 2019. So the amount of money given to the community becomes the determinant for the community to choose (Table 1).

Table 1. Time of Distribution of Money Patronage

| No | Nominal Money | Delivery Time |      |      |      |         | Number of Recipients |
|----|---------------|---------------|------|------|------|---------|----------------------|
|    |               | D -6          | D -5 | D -3 | D -1 | The Day |                      |
| 1  | 50 thousand   | 3             | 1    | -    | -    | -       | 4                    |
| 2  | 100 thousand  | 2             | 7    | 3    | 1    | -       | 13                   |
| 3  | 150 thousand  | -             | 3    | -    | 1    | -       | 4                    |
| 4  | 200 thousand  | -             | -    | 5    | 4    | 2       | 11                   |
|    | Total         | 5             | 11   | 8    | 6    | 2       | 32                   |

**Source:** Processed by Researchers from Primary data, 2019

In view of the time of distribution of the patronage money, there is a relationship between the time of distribution and the nominal amount of money that must be given by candidates. The closer to the election day, the more money candidates must give to the public. Candidates who give five days before a week usually have a nominal value of IDR 50 thousand and IDR 100 thousand, while those who approach election day, or one day before the election and even on election day, will increase in number because the average voter has been given money. To win votes, candidates must give more money than other candidates. The candidate who gives the lower amount of money will automatically lose and will not be elected if there is another candidate who gives the lower amount of money. However, if there is no candidate who gives more money, the candidate will be elected by the community even though the nominal given is not too large. This shows that money really determines the electability of a legislative candidate.

The relationship between wealth and democratic practices is also a concern of the perspective of political sociology, as Duverger (2005: 258-261) explains theoretically, both wealth and democracy as well as wealth and authority that have occurred since the rise of the European contenders. Asad's (2016) research in South Kalimantan, which is driven or sponsored by coal mining achievements, proves this.

In addition to money patronage, there is also patronage of goods, business opportunities and services as listed in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Goods Patronage, Business Opportunities and Services According to Candidates

| No | Informant | Patronase Type                                    |                        |  |
|----|-----------|---|------------------------|--|
|    |           | Material/goods                                    | Business opportunities | Service  |
| 1. | WY        | Muslim clothing, mug, Calender and Campaign tools | job opportunity        | repairing damaged roads, providing access to electricity |
| 2. | ZM        | Calendar, Shirt                                   | job opportunity        |  |
| 3. | FA        | Campaign tools                                    | job opportunity        | -  |
| 4. | HA        | basic needs and Campaign tools                    |                        | Assist in proposing the construction of a mosque         |
| 5. | YLU       | basic needs and Campaign tools                    | -                      | -  |

**Source:** Researchers compiled from primary data, 2019

Based on the form of patronage, the type of money patronage is in the first place, followed by the patronage of goods in the second position, in the third position is business opportunity and what is rarely done is service. The patronage items that are often given to candidates are basic necessities, apart from basic necessities, there are also those who provide clothes, headscarves, mukena and cups. Goods become an exchange rate that is not too high for the community. Therefore, candidates usually only give headscarves and mukena to the public, but there must also be money given so that people are willing to vote. Therefore most candidates only give money to be effective. Meanwhile, the basic needs given to the families of candidates only as a sign of gratitude to the family as well as the wages given to the times.

#### **4.2. Qualitative Results**

The patronage of money and goods described in the section denotes a political relationship that relies on money, goods distributed for political support. The goal is to get political support from voters to candidates in the 2019 legislative elections. Of the 6 legislative candidates who were the cases in this study. Of the 6 candidates, there are 3 incumbent candidates, 2 unelected candidates and 1 newly elected candidate. Those who become cases are WY (PDIP), FA (Gerindra), EP (Golkar), UA (PKS), and EY (PPP).

Political patronage, which shows that it is increasingly being felt by all candidates and times. In fact, it seems that it has become a pattern for gaining support from the community, given money, it is not necessarily elected, especially if it is not available at all. This practice applies not only to new candidates, but also to incumbents. An example was put forward by WY (38 years), who has been elected for 3 terms, from 2009 to 2019. "Giving money to the people nowadays is no longer something to be hidden because it is a common thing and can be a lesson in the future to fix the defects of democracy today. Facing a practical society, we automatically have to follow what society wants, otherwise we will be eliminated. Regarding the funds that I spend in electoral 1, it can be called the hell region, the money that needs to be prepared is more than in other electoral areas. The range of funds that must be prepared by candidates is 700 million-2 billion. If I am not that much, it is around 1.5 billion. Because I am already a member of the DPRD, there are advantages, so I am well known and have provided what the community needs. Even though we have helped a lot like public facilities, people still ask for an envelope to vote for me"(interview, 13 August 2019)

WY who is also the Chairperson of the PDIP DPD Ogan Ilir revealed that the pragmatic state of society and opponents in the election also used money patronage to get lots of votes, so he must also be able to attract voters by giving money during the election since the 2009 election. Funds issued by WY who is a distributor basic needs, not too much, but every period the cost or funds spent by WY to win the election is increasing. Society is increasingly pragmatic and rivals are also spending more and more money, so each candidate has to compete, whoever gives the most money is chosen. Because of that there is contestation, so every year it will increase. In 2019, the range that candidates must issue to get a seat can reach IDR 2 billion.

WY has served in the previous 2 terms and already knows what the aspirations of the people are as the basis of his mass. However, that is not enough, the community still asks for compensation from WY in the form of money. The range of money given to residents is IDR 100 thousand to IDR 150 thousand per person in areas where the mass is based. The areas that are the mass bases are Muara Penimbang Ulu, Muara Penimbang Ilir, and Indralaya Market. WY said that the money given to the community was made in homes, 3 days before the election. For times, WY provides money for each trip of IDR 1 million. As for operational costs, he spent IDR 1 billion.

WY recruited Times from his own relatives and families, who are widely available in Ogan Ilir District 1, apart from the support from WY's family, he was also assisted by friends and business partners. Because they have emotional closeness with WY, there are people who have become Times WY for three periods and there are also new Times. WY's strategy is to map in advance the mass base of WY, such as the area of origin and areas where there are many families and relatives so that many Times are placed. Whereas in areas where there were only a few mass bases, the Times for each village which became the mass base were placed five Times in villages outside the community base or the mass base of other candidates. WY has a target of getting at least twenty votes at each polling station.

IR became Times because of his long emotional relationship with WY. As WY Times 3 times, in 2009, 2014 and 2019. He earned a salary and also worked as a WY staff in the DPRD. WY also often helps IRs if there is a need, as well as IR. IR stated that the money given to the community to choose WY ranged from IDR 100,000 to IDR 150,000. To distribute them to the community each Times must first map and survey each village to see if there are rival candidates in the area. The money is distributed among residents' houses, some are given every day before the election, some are given during elections, which is often called the dawn attack.

The candidate for electoral district 1 Ogan Ilir who also served as the incumbent for the 2014-2019 period is the FA. In the 2019 FA election he was elected again for the second time from the Gerindra party. The FA is also open to providing information about campaign funds and strategies. Timses come from family, friends, friends, and extended family networks. Being a member of the DPRD benefits from being close to the community. For the past four years he has indeed been involved in the community, has gone into the field listening to the complaints and aspirations of the community so that the residents have sympathy for him to vote for him. The FA states that: "The range of funds that I spent during the campaign period was 1 billion to 1.5 billion, depending on how many they were able to get voters, some were 10 million and some were 20 million. Just like the others, around IDR 100 thousand to IDR 150 thousand. I didn't give a target. Some are H-5 before the election, at night. If for timses, they need money to run, the term is. Some voters came to me, some also came to the timses ". (interviewed 10 August 2019).

The FA stated that he spent between 1 and 1.5 billion for the 2019 election. The money he spent was greater than in 2014. For the timses, the FA said that each Timses was given money ranging from ten million to twenty million rupiah. Meanwhile, the community is given IDR 150,000 per head. The FA does not provide a target for the number of votes that must be obtained per time. The giving of money starts five days before the election. The core timses come from relatives and have long been the FA Timses, such as VDP which is one of the Timses and also its staff at the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). VDP was invited to work as a staff in the DPRD after he became the FA Timses. He has a role to find as many votes as possible to convince the public with words and money. Apart from VDP, there is MRS who is also the FA Timses which states that: "My job is to collect votes and introduce these candidates to the public, including explaining the vision and mission. I timses from 2014 to 2019, because the candidate is a family. The money he gave me was 15 million and he didn't set a target. Usually the people themselves ask for promises such as making up the road and others. Money given at homes and campaign venues such as event venues, amounting to around IDR 150 thousand per person, will be distributed 5 days before the election". (interviewed 5 August 2019).

The MRS stated that it was in charge of collecting as many votes as possible. MRS has been Timses since 2014. MRS is still a family member of the FA because of that he is trusted as Timses. Rewards given to him by candidates in the form of money and work. The money that MRS got was IDR 15 million. The FA did not target the range of votes its Timses should get. Money is usually given to the community in their respective homes or a celebration event. A voter receives IDR 150 thousand which is given to residents five days before the election.

EP, a former chairman of Regional Representative Council from the Golkar Party, has become a victim of money politics, because in the 2019 elections he was no longer elected. In an interview with EP, he expressed disappointment and sadness because he felt that he had served the community a lot, but his voice was minimal, did not meet to get 1 seat, and even lost votes from his fellow parties. As an incumbent, EP felt disappointed because he had served the community as the people's representative, apparently it was not a guarantee that he could pass the next election. The EP stated that the movement of money played very quickly soared high, so that candidates who did not have a special strategy and gave less money than other candidates were vulnerable to not being elected by the citizens. EP deeply regrets the current phenomenon of society that the cost to become a member of DPRD is very high, money politics has become commonplace. A candidate who cannot fulfill the people's wishes will not be elected. Although losing, EP is still heartbroken, for him in every battle there are winners and losers.

EP stated that from the approximate target number of votes that EP got by 2,500 people, it turned out that the votes that EP got were only 800 votes. Even though they lost, the EP Team did not get sanctions, it just felt bad for EP not being able to help to win in the 2019 Election. The weakness of the campaign that was carried out by EP and its Timses was that the amount of money distributed by the community was less than that of other candidates. EP said that the money given was IDR 100 thousand. And the gift is also a week from election day. So that residents may forget that there were other candidates who made bigger bids. Therefore, many people did not choose EP even though they had been given money. EP has also helped his mass base areas during his tenure as a member of the DPRD. In addition to the strategy of giving money, the existence of opponents from other candidates who also came from the EP mass base area was also the cause of defeat such as in three villages. People who chose EP only recorded their names, but did not take a copy of their ID, fear that some people abuse it. As stated by one of the voters who got money from Timses EP: "At that time, the one who received my father's (money), from two success tiem of EP, gave him IDR 100 thousand, three days before the election when his father gathered with his friends. While other candidates give at dawn as much as IDR 200 thousand per person, come to the house. Because the money for the candidates who came at dawn was greater, we chose that candidate. (interviewed 11 August 2019).

The amount of money given and the closer it is to election day, is the key word for the candidate's victory. This is what was experienced by the EP (incumbent) who lost in the 2019 election, because many of the EP's vote targets were taken by other candidates with more money and ahead of election time. This case was one of the factors for the disappointment of the legislative candidates who had spread a lot of money, but the votes of him and his party were not significant to win a seat in the board.

There are also many candidates who give money to the public but are not elected, such as candidates from the PPP (AL) party who give money to their neighbors of IDR 100 thousand. However, due to the small amount of money given, the mass base that was not too broad and the party's votes were still low, PPP did not get a seat in Electoral District. The money given by the Navy of PPP candidates was oriented and focused on the people who were their own neighbors. AL asked for help to be selected and the giving of the money was considered as a form of charity. RP was given IDR 300 thousand for three voters. Because it was a neighbor, RP could not refuse the Navy who came to ask for help. Likewise stated by TH that: "My neighbor has run his name, his party Navy is green, he came to the house around 3 days before the election to ask for help in electing him, in his speech he only asked for help and also the money he gave as alms, he said, there was no coercion from him. We were given 100,000 and one person because at my house there were 3 voters, so we got 300 thousand. Sikok was the one who came to the house because other candidates knew for sure that our hallway chose Alon, so the other cateches came". (interviewed 3 August 2019).

The above shows the importance of maintaining the voice, so that neighbors must be guarded, if not entered into by the timses of other candidates. That is the reason for AL to keep distributing money to its neighbors. If not in that way, other candidates and timses have stalked to win votes from them. This shows that there is no guarantee for candidates to be elected even if they are neighbors.

There are various strategies and tactics carried out by prepared legislative candidates, both those who have just run for office and those who are still in office and want to run again. This is in accordance with what was said by the elected candidate WY. The 2019 general election according to WY is very tough from the previous year because the candidates have extraordinary strategies, timses and the community also play the strategies of the candidates, because the results show the people cannot be said to be smart in choosing, they only choose candidates with strength. economy is the most profitable or at least the goods given have more value in the eyes of voters.

A resident, DPS who is a WY candidate voter emphasized that: "We chose WY because we felt bad about being given goods in the form of basic food items that were delivered directly to our village. We are very grateful to the WY candidates, therefore I invite other friends to also choose WY as a candidate for electoral district I Ogan Ilir". (Interview 30 August 2019).

From interviews and direct observations (shadowing Candidates) to Candidates in Electoral District at Ogan Ilir, it was found that direct visits to the community were very reliable for candidates and their winning team. People also tend to ask in kind from legislative candidates or timses. For some people, goods are a sign or down-payment to elect the candidate. According to several candidates who have run before, in the 2019 elections, money politics has become stronger and more massive.

The distribution of goods took various forms, from the dawn attack before voters to the polling station, to giving money at the polling station, and they are not shy anymore, some of them giving the night before election day. If goods are distributed before the election, namely in the form of basic necessities, insurance cards, and others. Then those who were previously members of the legislature, take advantage of their position to facilitate citizens to get social assistance or infrastructure facilities such as roads and bridges. Distribution of success team to base groups, family groups, motorcycle taxi drivers, and others. Long ago, candidates have been asked for donations to help build public facilities in Indralaya such as places of worship, construction of roads, waterways. If there are big family events such as parties and grief events, then candidates will visit them and make donations. Most of the items were given in the form of clothes, basic needs and others. For services, it can be in the form of health services, entertainment, performances, educational services and promises of giving money. Giving money, in various modes, especially through door to door as a classic mode, is by visiting constituents and then leaving money. Another way, the family of candidates or their volunteers give goods to a number of constituents at an Islamic recitation event.

This patronage strategy is used to get sympathy from the community, so that the political elite candidates can get votes or support from the community. The form of patronage for business opportunities is usually in the form of

promises such as awarding infrastructure projects, opening job opportunities and so on. Meanwhile, the forms of service patronage include free medical treatment and drilling wells, road repairs and so on.

The form of business opportunity patronage provided by DPRD Candidates is in the form of work. However, in granting this job, candidates do not directly give promises to the community that they will open or find jobs for the community. The method used is by distributing the success team to directly visit the community to inform the performance and assistance provided by the Candidates, especially when they are members of the DPRD (incumbent Candidates).

So, here the legislative candidates take advantage of their successful team to introduce their profile and performances to the public. Most of the candidates, both incumbent and new candidates, also tend not to give or make promises to the public about what they will do if elected. This is because the DPRD does not have a permanent work program and what they do is work according to the aspirations and complaints submitted by the community.

As for service patronage, candidates do not do things that can be directly enjoyed, for example health services or procurement of cheap basic necessities. This was done because candidates in their campaign activities used personal funds. Therefore they need to manage and use these funds appropriately so that they are not wasted. In addition, the coverage in the legislative elections, in this case the DPRD elections, is also relatively low. So, if there is one candidate who provides free medical treatment, surely other candidates will also do the same thing and it could be in the same place. As a result, their chances of being chosen by the community are decreasing and the money they spend on providing these services will also be wasted. That is why, with these considerations, candidates prefer to allocate the funds they have for more important matters. This explanation is also supported by the statement of one of the success team of the Ogan Ilir Electoral District Candidate 1, Mr. AR, which was also expressed by another candidate Mr. WI, S.T. Here's the AR narrative.

"For the election at the DPRD level, we do not have service activities such as posyandu, free medical treatment. Because things like that certainly also require large funds, while the funds they have are also limited ". (Interview, 4 September 2019). The form of services in the form of assistance provided by candidates is not purely derived from private funds owned by the candidates. However, the aids they provide also come from party programs that they participate in and are already running because they are part of the party's own work program. For example, such as tuition assistance for the less fortunate, assistance for the construction of mosques and so on.

Based on the explanation described above, it can be concluded that both incumbent and new candidates both use the patronage strategy in the form of business opportunities and services to get support from the community. The business opportunity patronage strategy used by incumbent and new candidates is the same, namely in the form of jobs that will later be given to the community after the candidate succeeds in becoming a member of the council.

## 5. Graphical Results

Theoretically, the purpose of patronage is to get political support from voters to candidates. In the 2019 legislative elections in Ogan Ilir Regency, there was patronage carried out by legislative candidates as a form of effort to maintain and win political positions in the legislature by exchanging capital owned by candidates and support from the community. Patronage occurs as a result of social stratification, where people are in the lower class while candidates are the owners of capital. So the occurrence of patronage is due to the people's need for the capital the candidates have, on the other hand, the candidates need votes from the voters.






Figure 1. Pattern of Patrons from Candidates to Voters

This type of money patronage has been proven at most in the election at the electoral district level 1 member of the Ogan Ilir Regency DPRD (Figure 1). A number of candidates compete with each other to win the most votes by way of patronage of money. Candidates are trying to exchange some of their money with as many votes as possible. Therefore, there was competition for the amount of money given to the public. Candidates who provide a greater nominal value of money also have a great opportunity to be elected by the public. According to Jeffrey Winters, money is more flexible than any other item.

Of the 30 community informants, 27 stated that they received patronage money from several legislative candidates, some of whom received money from more than one candidate. As for the consideration of the community in choosing candidates, it is determined from the nominal amount of money given. From table 1, the nominal money that candidates usually use to get one vote varies from IDR 50 thousand, IDR 100 thousand, IDR 150 thousand to IDR 200 thousand. Candidates must have another strategy in making vote buying, because there is high contestation between candidates to fight for 1 vote. The candidate who gives the largest amount of money will be the main consideration for the community to vote for him, in addition to providing daily necessities.

In some cases, a number of voters or families received political gifts or alms from 2 or more times. An example was experienced by DS who received money from Timses WY in the amount of IDR 200 thousand for one vote. At his house there were 3 voters, so the DS family received IDR 600 thousand. He also apparently received money from MN times SF (another candidate) which was the same nominal, so that DS and his family received IDR 1.2 million from the two Times. DS admitted that his family divided the votes to vote for WY and SF. This shows that citizens are pursuing a two-legged political strategy, accepting money without rejection from more than one candidate or success team. Another example: "There was a duo of people who came to the house, MS samo MN. MS, this is the times, Mr. WY. MN this time SF, they won a duet of 200 thousand. Kareno at Ado Wong's house 3 people were given 600 thousand. The one who received the money was my mother on H-1, so we at home chose Mr. WY samo SF, but the duet we got was still up to 600 thousand from each team. We share the votes because it is uncomfortable for them to be neighbors, right and left of us ". (interviewed 21 August 2019). The above shows that every citizen has the opportunity to get money from more than 1 candidate or success team, so that it can cause disappointment for candidates who have spent funds but do not get votes. Voters seem to only "enjoy" the practice of patronage money during the elections which are held for the 5th year.

Work becomes a high exchange rate for times. Loyal and competent times will be selected by candidates to become their assistants or expert staff. As was done by WY and FA, they have times that have helped him for a long time because they are work tied to WY and FA. Both candidates are also entrepreneurs so it is easy for them to hire someone. Meanwhile, incumbent candidates for service patronage are usually carried out because they already have capital and use their status as a member of the council to help the community. Programs carried out by Incumbent candidates such as WY have helped the community build roads, wells and make street lamps as a candidate for capital to be recognized by the public. From the perspective of exchanges, residents seem to be no longer interested in the policy programs offered by candidates, they prefer direct (cash), the results are more tangible and cash. Citizens also realize that the political process is longer, only for the people as voters to experience it.

The candidate who also conducts service patronage is HA. Before HA became a candidate, HA often helped residents by channeling programs to build mosques in remote places. The emotional closeness that underlies it, so that when HA became a candidate the services provided by HA became one of the considerations for the community to choose him. However, from all forms of patronage even though candidates have provided patronage of goods, business opportunities and services. The public will prefer candidates who give them money because they get personal and direct cash benefits, not in the form of promises that cannot be fulfilled after the legislative elections.

There is a tendency for voters to carry out multi-layered patronage, in addition to receiving double alms on money politics, also receiving goods, while hoping to get a job or service. Some even think that money is a proposal, while the giving of goods is a sign of completion. Furthermore, there are still others who hope that after the election they will get another job or service. Thus, an interesting finding, as well as a novelty, is shown by the layered structure of the Patronage operation. This is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Level (stages) of Political Alms (*sedekah*)

This massive patronage practice will have a wide impact, including the proliferation of corruption practices after the election, because the legislative candidates try hard to return political funds during the campaign. This is in line with the research of Menes (tt) and Muhtadi (2013). Likewise, research by Riwanto (2015: 89) states that the motive for political corruption by DPR and DPRD members is to return the expensive costs incurred during elections.

Patronage practices have an impact on people's mindset, especially meaning that democratic principles have been contaminated in patronage practices. The voice of conscience of a person in the form of pure aspiration can be purchased for the sake of interest. So it is this deflection of demands for conscience which can be called a crime. Another aspect of political ethics is the giving of money to the people in the hope that the election of certain political parties will have an impact on political education, namely mobilization which in turn clogs political participation. People in a process like this remain the object of political exploitation by those in power.

The emergence of social inequality with the existence of patronage practices between the rich and the poor because only people who have financial capital can serve in the government and in the absence of good political capacity, problems such as corruption will arise. If the patronage continues, it is certain that the world of politics will become increasingly damaged. Procedural democracy will only become the ground for mediocre people, namely those who do not have sufficient performance, to gain power. It is even possible that procedural democracy will be exploited by those who have an unstoppable desire and greed to control state assets. Therefore, they do all kinds of ways to gain power. This power will later be used to return the money that has been used to obtain office. In fact, he will be used to get wealth many times over. For this reason, patronage must be considered a major crime in politics that must be fought and eliminated together.

## 6. Conclusions

Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that the massive political patronage practice is considered a habit of politicians and the public, whether it is the provision of money, goods (basic food), services and services, both incumbent and new candidates, all of them practice patronage, except for one candidate only with goods. Meanwhile, service patronage and business opportunities are limited to incumbent candidates, because they already have political capital, particularly bargaining power with the executive. The incumbent also has power, so it is easy to recruit other people to work with him. However, the incumbent candidates who have contributed, if they do not give money, will not be elected by the citizens. Giving money creates opportunities, and the money seems to have just become a ticket, like the dowry of a candidate in the post-conflict local election. There are concerns from the legislative candidates that if they do not conduct patronage, there will be no chance of being elected as a member of the council. Giving is not necessarily chosen, especially if you don't give at all.

Voters almost all received money, apart from goods that were later called "political alms (*sedekah politik*)". Apart from the concept of political almsgiving as an invention, the amount of funds for candidates per electoral and per voter issued by candidates and how the process reaches the voters is also a finding and novelty. Likewise, the strategy of voters in one family to divide votes based on the amount of money received by candidates or times is also a novelty of this research.

There is a tendency for voters to receive multiple gifts, in addition to receiving double alms, money politics, also receiving goods, while hoping to get a job or service. Even those who think that money is a "proposal", while the

giving of goods is a "sign". Furthermore, there are still others who hope that after the election they will receive a "bonus" in the form of work or other services.

Interesting further research between political patronage in the presidential election and regional head elections, whether the patronage patterns have similarities and differences and political patronage patterns in the elections for regional heads and village heads. Is there a tandem collaboration between the candidates for the Regency DPRD and the Provincial DPRD or National Legislative Candidates (DPR) including in the distribution of political patronage, how does the patronage work in a tandem system (collaboration between candidates in stages).

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