Making Global Maritime Fulcrum Relevant: Efforts to Increase Indonesian Tuna Export to Japan

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Abstract
This research focuses on the competitiveness of Indonesian tuna in the Japanese market after global maritime fulcrum policy fully implemented in 2015. Using qualitative method, this research mainly relies on the analysis of publicly available secondary data. Applying state-centered approach in international trade with four variables which are: state-strength, social-welfare, promote potential industry, and intervention to increase competitiveness, and thus can explain kinds of government intervention in the market mechanism of a certain commodity. The result shows that global maritime fulcrum policy’s implementation is the evidence of the role of Indonesian government in interfering the market. Intervention is needed to achieve Indonesia’s national interests which are economic sovereignty, fulfilling domestic needs, and to be able to compete globally in the export process of tuna commodity to Japan.

Keywords

1. Introduction
The Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) is the doctrine launched by President Joko Widodo who aims to make Indonesia a strong, large, sovereign, and prosperous country in the field of maritime. To achieve GMF, it is a need to integrate various aspects including infrastructure, politics, law, socio-cultural, security, and economic. In addition, enforcement of territorial sovereignty; revitalization of marine economic sectors such as salt ponds, fisheries and aquaculture seaweed; development of maritime connectivity such as ship crossing services, port construction and sea tolls; marine environmental damage rehabilitation; quality and quantity of human resources in the maritime field. Of course, in achieving these targets, effective policy execution is required.

In the reign of President Joko Widodo, tuna is still one of the top export commodities in Indonesia. Director General of Fishery capture, Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries noted, Indonesia produces 16% of total global Tuna production in the period 2015-2017 (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 2019). The value of Tuna production also rose during this period. Indonesian Tuna production in total as much as 670,512 tons in 2015, increased to 714,148 tons in 2016 and 760,781 tons in 2017 (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 2019).

Specifically, Indonesia majority exports the results of its tuna fish to the state of Japan. 54% of tuna export commodities were dominant in exports to Japan, followed by the United States by 24% and the European Union by 23%. The need for a large Tuna from Japan makes Japan a potential market for the Indonesian Tuna fish commodity. Therefore, marine industrialization and fisheries are needed to focus on upstream downstream production systems to increase the value added, productivity and scale of marine production to capitalize on existing opportunities, which in line with the global maritime fulcrum policy.

Indonesian foreign policy traditionally covers several aspects including the establishment of population, strategic geographical position as well as potential natural resources (Leifer 1983). The statement implicitly confirms that the doctrine of the global maritime fulcrum can be said to be a doctrine that emphasizes policies regarding the utilization of natural resources and human resources to achieve Indonesia's national interests. The global maritime fulcrum
focuses on meeting the increase of food competitiveness in the sea, even to be able to become the ruler of the market in a country that imports many seafood products such as Japan. One example of seafood products is tuna fish. If we take the case of the export of tuna to Japan, which is one of the largest tuna importing countries in the world, Indonesia still loses competition with other countries in the number of exports to Japan, such as Taiwan, China, Korea South, Thailand. This missed potential should be maximized if there is synergy between stakeholders. The doctrine of the global maritime fulcrum and its relationship with Indonesia's strategy to sovereign in the field of food, especially the seafood, even to dominate the Japanese market as a major importer global tuna, can be further researched. Therefore, the problem formulation in this research is “how does the maritime axis policy affect the export of Indonesian tuna with Japan?” This research argues that a state-centered approach to seeing the global maritime fulcrum policy as proof of the country being on top of the market mechanism to achieve national interest: economically sovereign, meet domestic needs, competing globally through its involvement in the tuna commodity in the export process to Japan. This research uses qualitative research methods where qualitative research is a research based on the observation and group of non-numeric data. The steps in conducting qualitative research began by researching the problems and then conducting a review of the literature on the issues to be researched. Research is continued by conducting data collection, data analysis, and interpreting the data that has been collected to be correlated to the problems researched (Creswell 2009). By applying a case study approach, this research is conducted by deep dive the case and supported by data collection either from literature or resource from secondary data such as collection of information on books, journal articles, newspapers, or related documents.

2. Result and Discussion

2.1 Global Maritime Fulcrum Policy and Indonesia’s Tuna Export: State-Centered Approach

The Global maritime fulcrum policy is launched by President Joko Widodo in 2015. This policy emphasizes on the development of the marine sector that covers aspects in the 4-year span of 2015-2019 (Nainggolan 2015). Such aspects are infrastructure, political, legal, socio-cultural, security, and economic. Nainggolan (2015) argues that the Axis vision is welcomed by neighboring countries as it is considered able to facilitate the distribution line and reduce logistics costs, but some of the programs must be done carefully in order not to provoke tension with related countries, such as China whose vessel was once submerged. Meanwhile Saragi, Mamahit, and Prasetyo (2018) explains that the sea toll program which is one of the programs to realize the vision of the maritime fulcrum, has been running quite well and evidenced by the passing of marine toll subsidy, the development of hub port and feeder, logistics center, as well as multimodal transportation to support the marine industrial area. However, this program still finds some obstacles including the view of people who are still skeptical of the marine sector, the condition of the port and shipping is still not adequate in some areas especially remote areas, as well as access to facilities and infrastructures are still limited. Thus, in order to achieve the vision of a maritime shaft, one of which is able to sovereign economically by utilizing the seafood, it takes readiness from the central and local governments, acceleration of infrastructure development, human resource training, and strengthening Institutional institutions so that the smooth distribution flow can be maintained, and logistics costs can be suppressed so that Indonesia is able to compete from the trading side.

In addition, the economic and maritime security aspects of the Global Maritime Fulcrum policy can be highlighted. Syahrin (2018) emphasizes the relevance of the economic and security parts of the Global Maritime Fulcrum agenda because they are intertwined, with economic sovereignty evolving because of strong economic support, and security capabilities emerging because of strong economic support. According to Hudaya and Putra (2018), terrorism and piracy are the greatest threats to marine sovereignty, not only in terms of security but also in terms of economics. Indonesia's failure to ensure maritime safety may jeopardize its credibility as a government committed to implementing the maritime fulcrum policy. Furthermore, security surveillance flaws can have an impact on trade flows, maritime product production, and investor confidence, causing economic harm to Indonesia. Some previous research explained the potential of Indonesian Tuna fish. Kusnarsiyah (2017) suggests that Indonesia's marine productivity itself is a promising commodity, backed by GDP growth data that shows the fisheries sector as the highest growth sector in the period 2014-2016. Marine potential is also supported by the fact that Indonesia's coastline is the 2nd longest in the world with a length of 81,000 km. Tuna fish plays the role as one of the promising commodities from the Indonesian sea and this potential can be When governments execute appropriate policies, according to the maritime axis frame.

In addition, Yusuf et al. (2017) argues on how to increase the competition of Indonesian tuna products using RCA (Revealed Comparative Advantage) index. The higher the Indonesia RCA index on Tuna compared to competing
countries, the higher the Indonesian tuna commodity opportunity to rule the global market. To improve the RCA index, there are several factors, among others: government regulation related to product traceability, diversification of tuna product type and proper marketing strategy both from government and private sector. In addition, integrated economic development focused on the tuna sector with the support of adequate infrastructure, as well as easy distribution access, will attract investors to invest in the sector of tuna as it stimulates growth. The previous studies suggest that Indonesia is a country with a large maritime potential and has the capacity to become economic power by utilizing the maritime sector. Tuna products which are marine products, can become a king in the global market. The government’s role is important as one of the stakeholders in the tuna production sector should be able to execute policies that can improve Indonesia’s competitiveness in global tuna products. However, the various literature that exists only discusses the agenda of the maritime aspect from the point of view of security such as: the boundary guard area and the alien ship, discussing from the economic side without any specifications of certain commodities, and from the relationship between the doctrine of the maritime fulcrum with territorial sovereignty and by development. Likewise with the literature on the production of tuna, which has been widely examined is about the technical management of the tuna industry, as well as the study of the level of the Indonesian tuna products in terms of economic sciences.

So far, there is a few of literature that examines the relationship between government policy, especially Global Maritime Fulcrum to the ability of Indonesian tuna to control the market both other countries and global markets. Therefore, this research fills in the gap by focusing on the role of the Indonesian Government in the intervention of the Indonesian - Japanese tuna trade to affect the export of tuna, using state-centered approach in trade politics. This research uses the state-centered approach in trade politics from Oatley (2012). This approach believes that policy stakeholders intervene to achieve a common goal, aiming for general welfare is needed. Specifically, this approach underlines the role of government intervention to support the development of a particular national commodity. The state-centered approach is part of international political economy perspective that sees the importance of domestic policy in influencing the dynamics of international trade. In this case, domestic policy under the doctrine of the global maritime fulcrum, has a connection with the export conditions of Indonesian - Japanese tuna fish. Furthermore, Oatley outlines several variables in the state-centered approach namely: (1) State-Strength. The government works independently without the pressure of interest groups to produce policies that comply with national interests. The government that can run without disrupted pressure from the interest group is referred to as strong-state, while the government is easily influenced by the interest groups referred to as weak-state. In addition, centralization of policies is also an aspect of this variable; (2) Social-Welfare. The government works independently to achieve social justice, independent here referring to a unilateral, self-reliant government, and no other group intervention outside the government; (3) Promote Potential Industry. The country uses its capacity to advance the development of certain industries that will make a positive contribution to the development of the national economy; (4) Intervention to Increase Competitiveness. Government intervention can create an internationally competitive industry. The four variables above can explain the steps taken by a country to increase the competitiveness of a commodity to compete globally without taking too much of the market mechanism, but rather dominated by government intervention. The form of government intervention in question consists of some aspects such as protection against domestic products; the enforcement of tariff and non-tariff barriers to foreign products; subsidies; incentives, credits, tax waivers; and opening of access to the market.

The state-centered approach is in line and can describe some government programs in the field of the state that has been running. Data shows in two different periods, the period before which the maritime fulcrum policy was issued as well as the period after the implementation started. There is a distinction whereby the production of seafood (not only tuna but also other commodities) tends to fluctuate before the implementation of the global maritime fulcrum whereas the chart indicates the increase in sea yield production after its implementation. As for the operationalization of the four variables from the state-centered approach in the case of Indonesian tuna exports can be described in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>State-Strength</td>
<td>-Policy Collection unilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-No group intervention outside the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Institutional synergy at the central level</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Development of national governance system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Operationalization of State-Centered Approach
2. **Social-Welfare**
- Improved fishermen's welfare index
- Increase in the number of tuna production

3. **Promote Potential Industry(s)**
- Infrastructure development oriented to tuna fishery commodities
- The creation of conducive and efficient business investment climate through the development of marine economic Area

4. **Intervention to Increase Competitiveness**
- Subsidy
- Opening market access

Source: Oatley (2012)

### 2.2 Indonesia Tuna Commodity Exports
Tuna Fish is one of Indonesia's flagship fishery products. Since the early 2000's, Tuna dominates the export of Indonesian fishery fish abroad. Indonesia often exports Tuna fish to various countries, and the value of the export amount fluctuates. UN Comtrade notes Japan is one of Indonesia's biggest tuna export destinations with export volumes from Indonesia which can be seen in Figure 1.

![Tuna Indonesia-Japan Tuna Export Volume](image)

**Figure 1** Tuna Fishing period 2010-2018 to Japan (in Ton)
Source: Prepared from UN Comtrade (2019).

The chart shows the occurrence of export decline from 2010 to 2012, with an increase in the year 2013 meanwhile the volume of exports again fell drastically in the year 2015 and to rise gradually until the year 2018. It is also worth noting that the program in the maritime fulcrum effectively runs since 2015 where the government has finished transitioning from President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to President Joko Widodo.

As for the correlation between the maritime fulcrum policy with a drastic decline in the year 2015 one of them due to trans-shipment policy and a moratorium on ex-foreign ship so that Indonesia's exports are much switched to countries in Southeast Asia region. Transshipment policy requires fish entrepreneurs not to do unloading in the middle of the
sea because it is vulnerable to fish theft, but the transshipment policy makes employers unable to carry the catch result at once. Therefore, if exporting to a country whose location is far away will be a waste of time that it should have been using to catch fish. As a result, some exports moved to countries in Southeast Asia to streamline time. Lastly, the cause of declining Indonesian tuna exports to Japan is because Japan meets its needs by importing into other countries, as can be seen in the following table:

Table 2 Japanese Tuna imports Data table by country (in Ton)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>22.238</td>
<td>23.114</td>
<td>14.477</td>
<td>15.589</td>
<td>15.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>22.552</td>
<td>26.656</td>
<td>32.836</td>
<td>36.847</td>
<td>33.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>27.662</td>
<td>24.264</td>
<td>20.730</td>
<td>22.398</td>
<td>18.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>35.288</td>
<td>35.234</td>
<td>35.805</td>
<td>36.586</td>
<td>37.571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Comtrade (2019), processed by the authors

Table 2 shows that Indonesia is not Japan's main country in tuna imports, there are still 3 countries exporting tuna to Japan with much greater volume. In 2015, where the Japanese imports to Indonesia suffered drastic decline, there was an increase in imports from Japan to China as well as Thailand. This is a challenge for our government to be able to improve the competitiveness of Indonesian tuna fish in the Japanese market.

2.3 Indonesian State-Strength

State-strength is a term that explains the power of a country in addressing the economy of a commodity in a state-centered approach. Countries that are unaffected by the interests of other groups are referred to as strong-state whereas the affected state is referred to as weak-state. Japan in the post-war era of the Second World War was a strong-state example of the centralization of the power to improve the economy through synergy between the Ministry of Trade and Industry with the Ministry of Finance, which included industrial policy implementation (Oatley, 2012).

In the context of Indonesia and the doctrine of the global maritime fulcrum, the presidential decree contains seven pillars of Indonesian maritime policy. The Seven pillars are evidence that maritime policy implementation is the central role of the government without intervention from other interest groups. This can be proved by the decision of the government to establish a new Coordinating Ministry of Maritime based on Presidential Decree (Perpres) RI Number 10/2015 where it has the function to coordinate related ministries in the maritime field.

Another proof of synergy between the relevant ministries to the Indonesian tuna is the similarity of the objectives of the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Trade. These three ministries championed the release of Indonesian tuna import duty in Japan which has been Indonesian tuna inhibitor to control the Japanese market.

One of the efforts of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries was by holding a working visit on 30 May 2018 by Minister Susi Pudjiastuti to lobby the Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro Kono removed the import duty by 7% through the previous Indonesia Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (JIEPA) scheme that Japan has already done to Thai and Vietnamese countries. In the same work visit, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries also synergizes with Ministry of Foreign Affairs to negotiate with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) to invite investors from Japan to invest in the Indonesian fisheries sector. This is done as an effort to stimulate the development of maritime sector.

The Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries as one of the important actors in the agenda of the global maritime fulcrum also shows evidence that the government will not be affected by the urges of some interest groups, it is evidenced by the enactment of ministerial regulation Number 71/2016 on the fishing track and placement of fish capture equipment in the Indonesian territory of fisheries management. The ministerial regulation remained despite insisting on the disappearing of many business actors. Some businessmen claim the prohibition of cantrang (an active and massive fishing tool with operation touching the seabed) will harm fishermen while the ministry believes that this tool damaging the marine ecosystem. In addition, it sometimes catches fish that should not be caught so that it will harm the fishermen himself.
The Ministry of Trade also had the same goal to make Japan able to remove the 7% import duty. In General Review-IJEPA (GR-IJEPA), the ministry sent a delegation to conduct negotiations at the Joint Committee Meeting-8 on 8-10 August 2018 in Tokyo. Furthermore, the continued IJEPA scheme is confirmed by the Minister of Trade, that they will meet the settlement with the target at the end of the year 2019. In addition, several other agreements will also be championed to support Indonesia's seafood to be able to dominate the Japanese market. In addition to IJEPA, Indonesia also lobbied Japan to immediately complete the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Synergy from various ministries is also proven by the holding of the inter-ministerial Meeting on 31 June 2019 to discuss the specifics of Indonesia's fresh position and value at IJEPA. These efforts constitute evidence of the government in using its authority without being affected by external parties, as well as government evidence to centralize the maritime field, thereby creating a strong-state identity in accordance with a state-centered approach. Lastly, synergy between Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs with the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries also implications for maritime policymaking. The two ministers in which (Luhut B. Pandjaitan and Susi Pudjiastuti) are often shown with different views regarding some issues in public. However, the synergy between the two ministries is still well-running as stated in the Presidential Decree No. 10, 2015. Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs exercised its function in coordinating the 4 ministries under it. Specifically with the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs has held various coordination programs such as the discussion of the Plan of Action with foreign countries, discussions related to the landscape documents, as well as the implementation of a quarterly coordination meeting (Kemenko Maritim 2019).

### 2.4 Social-Welfare

The indicators in the state-centered approach are increasing the fishery welfare index and the increase in the number of tuna production. The nine agenda of priority of government shows on increasing productivity and competitiveness in the international market as well as creating economic independence by moving strategic sectors, hence the objective of the global maritime fulcrum can be achieved. It is indeed to achieve national interests in the economic sector, one of them through the eradication program Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IIU) Fishing. IUU Fishing itself is a term that includes various illegal fishing activities ranging from the arrest in the sea and in the sea that has a national jurisdiction of a country (FAO 2019). FAO records the losses suffered by Indonesia due to IUU fishing reach 30 trillion Rupiah annually, while at the beginning of year 2014, Ministry of Maritime Affairs by Indonesia due to activities IUU fishing reach 240 Trillion Rupiah. Apart from data discrepancies, IUU fishing is obviously detrimental to the Indonesian fisheries sector. Allowing IUU fishing can result in the low ability of Indonesian tuna to compete in the Japanese market due to low fish production. Through the notion of maritime shafts, the government seeks to increase Indonesian tuna production by eradicating the various activities of IUU fishing through various policies. Among them are transshipment policies, moratorium on ex-foreign vessels, and the warring of thieves.

Transshipment policy is an unloading policy banning in the offshore sea. It means that the entire fishing vessel that has been capturing, then transferring the catch to another vessel (collector ship) should not do the activity. Rather, the fishing vessel must go back to the beach first to unload the cargo, new ships can go to catch fish again. Next, the ex-foreign ship moratorium policy. The policy contained in ministerial regulation Number 56/2014 is briefly a policy that prohibits the issuance of extension of Fisheries Business License (SIUP), fishing permit (SIPI), and the license of Fishing qualification (SIKPI) For cargo vessels over 30 GT manufactured overseas. Data shows more than 1,300 foreign vessels engaged in IUU fishing practices including the capture without export recording, doing excessive fishing to threaten the sustainability of the sea, and the ship from foreign ship. The majority of foreigners threaten the employment of local people. (CTF 2018)

After the implementation of law on IUU fishing, several local fish companies both private and state enterprises and local-owned business entity recorded experiencing increased production of tuna. Among them Perum Perindo Unit Makassar whose tuna catch rose 80% in the year 2018 to 250 ton compared with the previous year which is only 40-50 tons. It was confirmed directly by the head of Perum Perindo Unit Makassar Perindo, Indar Widjaja that the rise of tuna production is influenced by the eradication of IUU fishing in Indonesian waters.

In addition to Perum Perindo, Aidaya company who is a tuna exporter company in Gorontalo also increased tuna exports to Japan. In the first quarter of 2019 alone, Aidaya have been able to export 11.4 tons of tuna to Japan, which usually only around 9 tons per quarter year (PR Prov. Gorontalo 2019).

In addition to Gorontalo, the increase in welfare also felt by fishermen in Padang Pariaman District and in Maluku Province. The last Data in June 2019 mentions fishermen in Pasir Baru, Padang Pariaman Regency can get a catch of 500 tons for once at sea. 500 tons of fish is a mixture of various kinds of fish such as tuna, skipjack, cob, or cork. Meanwhile, in Maluku, the value of the alliance's exports commodity in the period from January to April 2019
increased by 64.94% with a value of 3.76 million US dollars. The export of fishery commodities is aimed at Singapore, Malaysia, Japan (BPS Maluku 2019).

Lastly, social welfare for fishermen can be measured by an index called the Fisherman exchange rate (NTN). The fisherman's exchange rate (NTN) is one of the indicators in viewing the welfare of fisherman in a certain month or year. NTN itself is the ratio between the price index received (revenue) and the price that should be incurred by the fishermen (expense) and expressed in the form of percentages. If NTN is more than 100, then the fishermen have higher revenues than the expenditure (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 2015).

Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti claims the exchange rate of fishermen has continued to increase from 2014 since the beginning of the maritime axis policy. Before the year 2014, NTN Indonesia was under 106. However, it has a constant increase every year.

Table 3 Fisherman exchange Rate Index (Fisherman's welfare indicator)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fisherman Exchange Rate Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>104.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>106.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>108.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>109.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>2019*</td>
<td>113.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Last Data until the month of May 2019

Source: Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries (2019), processed by the authors

2.5 Promote Potential Industry

The state-centered approach believes that forms of state intervention to increase economic competitiveness are carried out on commodities that have the potential to provide a positive contribution value to the national economy. On the agenda of the maritime axis, we can see that the focus of the Indonesian Government in carrying out its sustainability policies focuses on fishery commodities, specifically on shrimp and tuna commodities. This is expressed implicitly by the Director general of processing and marketing of fishery results (Dirjen P2HP), Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries in 2015.

Director General of P2HP said that tuna became the priority of the Indonesian government because tuna is a good source of protein and is an important food source in the world, so that the needs of global tuna increase, and Indonesia must adapt to the condition. If government policy runs effectively, Indonesian tuna production can increase.

2.6 Business Investment Climate Creation

Proof of government put the focus on the tuna industry is to do the development of special economic area (Kawasan Ekonomi Khusus, KEK) in three regions in East Indonesia, namely KEK Bitung, KEK Maloy, and KEK Morotai which has been inaugurated on 1 April 2019 (Tirto 2019). As for the KEK is expected to attract investments amounting to 110 trillion Rupiah and absorb 120,000 people as stated by President of Indonesia in 2019.

For fisheries sector itself will be focused in KEK Bitung and KEK Morotai. KEK Bitung has a strategic location as a gateway to countries in Asia-Pacific, supported by the international port of Bitung while KEK Morotai is a KEK that is located on the outer island for Indonesia's eastern region so close with several Pacific countries, and also Morotai crossed the Indonesian Archipelago Sea flow III which is a path of tuna migration (PP RI 2002).

Potential is expected to present from the development of this KEK among others is attracting investors with the total value of investment in the fisheries sector of 30.44 trillion Rupiah for KEK Morotai, this KEK also aims to maximize the potential of capture fisheries in Morotai can reach 62,294 tons/year but now only utilized about 9% or about 6,272 tons/year. (Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries 2019).

2.7 Infrastructure Development

The acceleration of the development of marine infrastructure can be divided into 3 namely the development of the port, increasing the efficiency of sea toll through the addition of fleet, and the development of special economic area on the coast. For port development, data shows the number of ports of 2012-2017 period showing the trend that tends
to rise with the highest rise in the year 2016, but not comparable to the increase of infrastructure procurement of marine fleet that experienced Significant increase since 2012 especially on sea freight fleet. The full data can be seen in the Figure 2.

![Figure 2 Total Port Data in Indonesia](source)

Figure 2 Total Port Data in Indonesia
Source: Ministry of Transportation (2018), processed by Tirto.id

![Figure 3 Total Sea Freight Fleet Data](source)

Figure 3 Total Sea Freight Fleet Data
Source: Ministry of Transportation (2018), processed by Tirto.id

Figure 3 explains that the development of port infrastructure in Indonesia has not experienced a significant increase, inversely proportional to the procurement of infrastructure of the sea fleet is increasing rapidly. It is necessary to be a record for the government to make the ratio of the seaport and the ships can be balanced, so as to serve various regions in Indonesia.

### 2.8 Intervention to Increase Competitiveness
Interventions are evidence that governments have a higher authority than market mechanisms in determining the dynamics of international trade, as well as enhancing the competitiveness of commodities. The Indonesian Government through the doctrine of maritime shafts also conducts various market interventions to ensure that Indonesian tuna commodities can compete in the Japanese market.

2.9 Subsidies
Subsidies are an example of the most apparent government intervention on market dynamics. In the context of tuna commodities, the Indonesian government has heavily subsidized as an effort to help fishermen, as well as fishing companies to increase the productivity of business actors. The government subsidy is the evidence of subsidies by channeling kit converters. The kit converter is a tool that serves to convert fuel from oil to gas. Ministry of Energy and Mineral resources in 2018, has been synergized to share the 40,000 kit converter packs for fishermen. 40,000 kit converter packs are distributed for fishermen aboard a petrol-powered < 5 GT with a maximum power of 20 horsepower.

The government also provides diesel subsidies for small fishermen under a 30GT ship registered in the official agency with a legal umbrella of Perpres RI No. 191 year 2014 on the provision, distribution, and retail price of petroleum fuel. In the year 2018, the national quota for its own solar subsidy reached 15.5 million Kiloliter (Pertamina 2019). Solar subsidies are also done carefully so that subsidies are not mistargeted. For example, in West Kalimantan, fishermen who want to enjoy FUEL subsidies must come to a fishing station (SPBN) so that the implementation of subsidized solar distribution can be directly supervised by Pertamina. In his Mission district, distribution was conducted in 3 SPBN, SPBN CV Care Oil and gas, SPBN cooperative Samudra Jaya, and SPBN LEPPM3, with total solar distribution as much as 360 KL/month or 4,320 KL/year.

Subsidies in the fisheries sector are also provided in indirect form in the form of a subsidized sea toll operating cost. The sea toll road runs due to subsidies, as well as the acceleration program for marine infrastructure development. The sea toll itself is important for the export of tuna because it requires access to distribute tuna from the place of arrest to the international port for further export to Japan. The Ministry of Transportation said the sea toll is always subsidized annually by the Government despite its operations run by state-owned and private enterprises. In 2017, subsidies were awarded 380 billion rupiah, the year 2018 of 447.6 billion rupiah, and in 2019 for 222 billion rupiah on the grounds of state budget savings (Tirto, 2019).

Presidential Decree No. 38-2019 on the provision and determination of LPG prices for fishing vessels for target fishermen and water pump machines for target farmers is also a form of government subsidies to fishermen. Through the Presidential decree, the government will regulate LPG subsidies 3 Kg to fishermen starting with the ' starter package ' is the initial subsidies to fishermen in the form of packages consisting of: Ship machines, Kit converters, LPG 3 Kg, along with supporting equipment. Subsidies are carried out by the central government and there are several conditions among them fisherman's identity card, using environmentally friendly capture equipment, vessels with a maximum size of 5 GT, and previously had not received assistance from the Government (Perpres RI No. 38 2019)

2.10 Opening of Market Access
Directorate General of Capture Fisheries through the Directorate of Licensing and Fisheries has held activities of fishermen business development centered in the ocean fishing port (PPS) Kendari. The series of activities consist of the expo and the funding outlets of fishermen, fishermen insurance outlets, regional licensing outlets, booths logging the crew/fishermen, technical guidance development and diversification of fishermen business, signatory agreements and the inauguration of a fisherman's funding corner (Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries 2019). This activity is part of the development of this fishing business to facilitate fishermen in accessing capital through financial institutions, the ease of obtaining fishermen insurance through insurance institutions with the assistance Program of fishermen Insurance Premium As well as independent and growing entrepreneurial skill and also improves skills for fishermen and their families through technical guidance of development and diversification of business as an alternative livelihood (MPA).

Based on the prior exposure of the sub-chapters, Indonesia's efforts to increase the competitiveness of tuna to compete in the Japanese market can be seen through the maritime shaft frame where the maritime axis has several policy derivatives that correspond Variables on the state-centered approach. Various policies are evidence of government involvement or intervention on the market mechanism of tuna commodities.

3. Conclusion
The various programs that are carried out in the global maritime fulcrum conducted by Indonesia to control the tuna market in Japan are evidence of the seriousness of the government to increase the potential industrial commodities
using its authority. Various interventions carried out in the form of subsidies, maritime diplomacy to other countries, as well as strengthening the synergy of the Ministry and centralization of policy is evidence that the government has power over the market mechanisms in determining dynamics of international trade. This research concludes that the state-centered approach implemented by the government of Indonesia within the context of global maritime fulcrum has an impact on Indonesian tuna exports to Japan. Indonesia has increased tuna exports to Japan since the doctrine of global maritime fulcrum began to be effective in 2015, although the increase was not too significant. The decline occurred in the period 2014-2015 due to various factors including the decline of production due to the reduction of vessels that operate due to a moratorium of foreign vessels and the enactment of transshipment restrictions so that the catch cannot be efficient. It shows that the various programs implemented as part of the government efforts to control the market of tuna to compete to meet Indonesia's national interests to sovereign economically, fulfilling social welfare communities, and compete globally. However, it takes consistency from the government of Indonesia to uphold regulation without the influence of interest groups from both inside and outside the country so that the policy can run effectively. In addition, Indonesia should be able to utilize the maximum state-centered approach by controlling the subsidies given to the right target and not be enjoyed by large entrepreneurs and by enlarging the social-welfare scope of the state-centered approach of the fishermen-oriented welfare, becomes the national welfare.

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