The Role of Middle Power Country from Global-South in Multilateral Climate Change Negotiation Conference: Indonesia Role in Katowice Climate Change Conference

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Abstract

This article examines Indonesia's role as a middle power in the Katowice Climate Change Conference or COP-24. To voice developing countries' interest, Indonesia has pursued three important negotiation points toward developed countries in order to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement namely financial support, technology transfer, and capacity building. To overcome tension between developed and developing countries, Indonesia has mobilized its middle power status particularly in the importance of developed countries to fulfil their commitments to developing countries. During the negotiation, Indonesian negotiators seek to use the middle power position symbolically as a negotiating power and become representatives of other developing countries to reach a negotiating agreement at COP24. This can be seen in Indonesia's ability to create a narrative of symbolic power in the form of language, and identity, which is able to convince developed countries to agree with Indonesia's demands. This article then contributes to the middle power literature by bringing the discussion of symbolic power into the discussion.

Keywords
Climate, Change, Multilateralism, symbolic, power.

1. Introduction
Many literature have established the importance of middle power in regional and global order (Beeson & Higgott, 2014; Blaxekjær, 2015; Cooper, 2011). Most studies show that due to its limited capacity, middle power's primary roles mainly revolve around mediator, facilitator and bridge builder, emphasizing multilateralism (Holbraad, 1971; Pandey & Watson, 2014; Siwon, 2015). This middle power diplomacy then focuses on diplomacy that put forward technical competence, effective communication, and moral suasion (Cooper, 2011). Such focus on small number functional niches would allow middle power to concentrate their resources.

One crucial agenda in which the middle power has shown greater interest and leadership is in multilateral negotiations of the climate change issue (Dimitrov, 2010). Countries such as Australia, Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Korea have shown a greater roles in many international for a concerning in climate change issue (Hochstetler & Milkoreit, 2015; Siwon, 2015). Most studies of a middle power in climate change focus on the use of coalition-building as well as network position as s diplomatic strategy to take advantage of increasingly decentralizing power (Patience, 2014; Watson, 2015). Through the establishment of Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), South Korea able to create a coalition for a middle power to be able to oppose large powers and lay down its demands also win the international society's approval (Kim, 2016, p. 149). Watson (2015) further shows how middle powers are creating their own

specific forum as network through minilateral forum allowing middle power leverage to reframing specific niche issues such as climate change.

Despite the growing literature that focus on the role of middle power in climate change negotiation, those studies primarily conceptualize middle power within behavioral and functional approach. This article aims to fill the gap by mobilizing the notion of symbolic power to understand the role of middle power in a climate change negotiation conference. Arguably, the notion of symbolic power enables us to elucidate how a middle power uses labels or social identities through the notion of language in negotiation settings. Symbolic representations can be mobilized as a strategic to gain a dominant position which enables the states to pursue their national agenda. To elucidate symbolic power in action, this article will examine the role of middle power, specifically Indonesia, as a case study in the multilateral Katowice Climate Change Conference held in Poland, 2018.

Katowice Climate Change Conference, commonly known as Conference of Parties (COP)-24, takes place in Katowice, Poland, starting from 3rd until 15th December 2018. COP-24 is a forum of the multilateral interactions with fellow countries members of the United Nation Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) to fulfill commitments to reduce world emission levels that threaten international security due to global warming and climate change. Moreover, this conference produced a rulebook called The Paris Rulebook that provided a roadmap implementation of the Paris Agreement agreed by all members at the previous conference of COP21 in Paris 2015.

During the negotiations, The Katowice climate change conference exposed the dilemma of interests between developed and developing countries (Christiastuti, 2018). The developed countries required developing countries to participate in implementing Paris Agreement. However, developing countries feel objection due to the limited capacity to implement the Paris Agreement. As one of the conference participants, Indonesia is negotiating to advance the Paris Agreement rulebook's flexibility to achieve equality of the Paris Agreement implementation that requested by the developed countries during the conference of COP24.

Indonesia tries to voice the importance of developed countries to assisting developing countries. Indonesia is attempted to use its middle power status at this conference to increase its interest as a developing country. By using the symbolic power in shape of language and identity, Indonesia tries to negotiate requests for assistance from developed countries. These negotiations took place during the COP-24 conference process, with the Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia (DELRI) acting as negotiators. However, there are tensions between developed and developing countries, these negotiators will bridge the dialogue between UNFCCC members to help find an agreement at a COP-24 that is fair not only for developed countries but also developing countries.

In voicing the interest of developing countries, Indonesia reminded the importance of fulfilling the commitments of developed countries, increasing the ambition of actions and means of supporting implementation for developing countries to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement through Financial support, technological transfer, and capacity building. Such position taken by Indonesia is reinforced by its middle power state that enable it to take a greater role in a specific agenda of international affairs.

This article shows that at Katowice Climate Change Conference, Indonesian negotiators use symbolic power to advance Indonesia's interest in negotiations, particularly in area of financial support, technology transfer, and capacity building. Indonesian negotiators attempt to use middle power positions symbolically as a power to negotiate and become representative for other developing countries to reach a negotiation agreement at COP24.

1.1 Objectives
This article shows that at Katowice Climate Change Conference, Indonesian negotiators use symbolic power to advance Indonesia's interest in negotiations, particularly in area of financial support, technology transfer, and capacity building. Indonesian negotiators attempt to use middle power positions symbolically as a power to negotiate and become representative for other developing countries to reach a negotiation agreement at COP24.

2. Literature Review
The position of a middle power country in global order has attracted a great deal of attention from academia and literature. Some studies are focusing on the role of middle power with a different approach in the global order. In this literature review, I situate the article with two broad approach in understanding middle powers namely functional and

behavioral. The functional approach will particularly focus on the use geopolitics and alliance in utilize the role of middle power. Then, behavioral approach will show by understanding previous review that use mediator as the role of middle power in global order. Lastly, this section will demonstrate a review from previous literature about the role of middle power countries in climate change.

The functional approach is a 'functional' way of distinguishing between middle-power and small-power countries. Countries with middle power status are able to influence global order based on their ability and capacity to contribute to international problems. This functional approach provides a vision of how a country functions based on the conditions of the country's interests, the direct contribution of the state to the situation concerned, and the capacity of the state (Chapnick, 2014) .

The Behavioral approach, on the other hand, identifies the middle powers that seek multilateral solutions to international problems. This approach focuses on foreign policy behavior and diplomacy as well. The behavioral approach appears to be a diplomatic approach aimed at reducing conflict and fostering cooperation with other parties. This strategy promotes behaviors that encourage middle powers to play a larger role in the international order. This strategy is based on countries broadening their diplomatic interests and engaging in global issues even when they have no direct and concrete interests.

In order to comprehend the functional approach of the middle power in global order. Rafl Emmers and Sarah Teo (2015) demonstrate the role of a middle power by focus on geopolitics. They analyse Indonesia, South Korea, Australia, and Vietnam because their geopolitics are influenced by differences in resource availability and strategic environment. The greater the availability of resources and the strategic environment, the more likely middle power confidence to build networks and strengthen its functional in global order.

The main reason of middle power to forming an alliance is to seek and develop a regional grouping strategy. According to Allan Patience (2014), he argues that several middle-power countries that are still active in global politics, such as Australia, Canada, India, Chile, and Indonesia, should broaden the concept of political alliance. They saw Alliance politics assisting middle powers in responding to international issues and increasing networking in the global order (Patience, 2014). Besides of that, a strong cooperative relationship in the alliance is required as a measurement to justify the effectiveness of middle power roles in specific agendas as stated by Iain Watson (2015). In that sense, he believed that the role of the middle power will be more effective and broaden. For example, The Korea-Indonesia-Australia (KIA) successfully becoming a key role to emphasizing networking strategy in Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) (Watson, 2015).

While functional approach seems to dominate middle power literature, there is a growing study that examine roles that middle power taken. This can be seen as a behavioral approach. The role of middle power is also known to becoming a mediator between countries with different major power in the global order. Mediator has been one of the characteristics of a middle power role. According to Chandra Lal Pandey and Iain Watson (2014), the expression of middle power has a robust power to influence in global order situation they involved and take a role to play. Thus, middle power comes in as a mediator to bridging the dialogue between countries in one forum to achieve the purpose of discussion (Pandey & Watson, 2014).

Despite the abundance literature on middle power role, no serious study that aims to explain how middle power utilize their role using symbolic power. This article aims to fill the gap the role of middle power in climate change, specifically in climate change negotiation, using symbolic power as a concept to examine the role of middle power mainly focus in Indonesia. Although some studies took Indonesia as study cases, none of them utilize Indonesia as a focal point because it was merged with other middle power countries. Despite the literature review, here we argue that symbolic power might be the best concept to understand the role of Indonesia as a middle power in the multilateral climate change negotiations conference. Furthermore, this article will understand how symbolic power explains the role of Indonesia through the power that is invisible in carrying out its role at a multilateral climate change conference in Katowice, Poland, 2018.

3. Methods

In discussing the conceptual framework, this article will adopt the concept of symbolic power to clarify Indonesia's role and position as a middle power country in a multilateral climate change conference. According to Pierre Bourdieu

(1991), Symbolic power is defined as a power that is not visible and is only symbolically conveyed to confirm or change the vision of the world. As a research method, symbolic power clears up the idea of invisible power to build trust through dominant domination mechanisms. The purpose is to facilitate and support the communication between countries and show dominance symbolically as power in global order (Bourdieu, 1991).

Symbolic power focus on strategizing the position of countries to the top position of hierarchy and determine the parameters of soft power action in International Relations, according to Matthew Eagleton-Pierce (2013). Besides that, symbolic power can be used as a weapon or tool that can be used legally by many actors to support interaction, communication, and soft diplomacy to achieve a dominant position and achieve individual or common interest. Lastly, Matthew Eagleton-Pierce saying that various stakeholders could use the concept of symbolic power, whether the state or institution, as long as it has recognition and an indication that can be conveyed symbolically as strength (Eagleton-Pierce, 2013).

In analyzing the role of a middle power in multilateral climate change negotiation, this article mobilizes the concept of symbolic power, specifically Indonesia, as a case study in the multilateral Katowice Climate Change Conference. To make it easier to analyze the cases, symbolic power will be divided into two parts of the concept. Firstly, social space, and secondly, is symbolic strength. Each part represents the variables of this article to justify the symbolic power used by Indonesian negotiators to negotiate in the Katowice climate change conference 2018.

3.1. Social Space

Social space in symbolic power defines as a space or a place for interaction and communication between actors depending on the position of actors. Pierre Bourdieu (1989) described the interaction between actors to gain recognition symbolically to achieve goals (Bourdieu, 1989). Social space must be in in the shape of an active forum that can accommodate its members' aspirations and the actors can symbolically appear to. As an illustration of stable and active space, the Conference Of Parties (COP) under UNFCCC could be one example. Because in this conference since 1995 until now, they provided active circumstances of negotiations between countries from various positions of power such as middle power and great power or developed countries and developing countries. The idea of social space to accommodate the aspirations of actors symbolically where these actors have different backgrounds, strengths, and positions, so they still have the opportunity to communicate with actors who have more power.

As an illustration of the social space of symbolic power in this article, we described the operation of the multilateral conference on climate change negotiations as a space for social interaction. The social space described through Katowice Climate Change Conference in Poland in 2018. Indonesian negotiators in this situation were tasked to using this conference as a chance to contribute to negotiations and having an interaction with other fellow members of COP24 in delivering Indonesia's negotiating points. The negotiating points that Indonesian negotiators are conveying are called symbolic strength.

In this conference, most member countries negotiating climate change become actors who want to occupy a dominant position. That aims to channel their aspirations to all members, especially developing countries, towards developed countries through representatives of each country. Also, in the concept of social space, the role of actor representatives is crucial to carry out the task of achieving a dominant position and use this space to contribute optimally. For example, a nation's diplomat must play a dominant role in a discussion or forum because they must prioritize the symbolic strength of their own country or its equivalent. The process of domination occurs in the form of dialogue or negotiation. In general, symbolic power is referred to as the role of language power in which the state symbolically proposes itself to negotiate.

3.2. Symbolic Strength

The next concept is symbolic strength; this concept is another word for symbolic power. Symbolic strength has the exact phrase as symbolic power in general. It refers to how a country using invisible power to build up a strong foundation in the international order. In terms of symbolic power as an invisible power, it tries to conceptualize the position of a nation through instructions, habits, and routines as a force that embraces different levels of power in each country. Symbolic strength represents a country through two aspects, which are language and identity. These two aspects are categorized as invisible power because they are only symbolically conveyed by the state as the power of a country to achieve its goals.

In line with the middle power role analysis in multilateral climate change negotiation, the Indonesian negotiators attempted to occupy a dominant position of negotiation by using language and identity to negotiate. Firstly, Indonesian negotiators advanced the concept of symbolic power by putting middle power as an identity inside the content of negotiations symbolically to promote the negotiation point. Secondly, Indonesian negotiators then utilize the symbolic strength of language by negotiation that includes three main focus of Indonesia point in climate change issues such as financial support, technological transfer, and capacity building.

In general, the implementation concept of symbolic power is almost the same as soft diplomacy. Symbolic power, in this case, is only conveyed through language and identity, which is categorized as invisible power in symbolic power. The use of symbolic power through language and identity is the primary source of strength in social space because social space is only a facilitator so that interactions occur so that through this communication, the actors can play a role. Technically, Merje Kuus (2015) implies that when actors symbolically use language and identity, they aim to increases the power of actors in global orders that can effectively be recognized, identified, and recognized by other dominators to negotiate (Table 1).

Table 1. Symbolic Power Conceptual Framework

SYMBOLIC POWER	OPERATIONAL	ILLUSTRATION
Social Space	A space of social interaction	Multilateral climate change negotiations conference: Katowice Climate Change Conference or COP 24 in Poland 2018
Symbolic Strength	Invisible power in the shape of language and identity	A middle power in the negotiation process to propose three critical negotiations aspect; Financial support, technology transfer, and capacity building

(source: Author)

Middle-power can be a symbolic strength mobilized by developing countries. This is because the status of middle power has more capabilities than other developing countries without middle power status. One of them is seen from the status of the middle power with functional and behavioural approaches, although they have some limitations, but still able to emerge at the international level. Seeing from the Indonesian side as study case, with its middle power status, Indonesia tries to voice the importance of developed countries to help developing countries. Of course, this is due to Indonesia's ability to build symbolic strength with a middle-power state and creating a social interaction in social space.

Indonesia, as a middle-power country as well as a developing country, is attempting to develop a negotiating position with developed countries. Indonesia creates a narrative of symbolic strength in the shape of language, and identity, which is capable of creating interactions in a social space. Because of its position as a middle power, Indonesia is able to express its concerns to other developing countries. One of them is by promoting financial assistance, technological transfers, and capacity building, which are required to assist developing countries in implementing the Paris Agreement.

4. Data Collection

As a methodology, I will apply data collection using a qualitative method to answer the research questions in this article. Qualitative data can describe the object of research in detail with descriptions that cannot be explained numerically. Therefore, although it cannot be measured with certainty, many researchers still use qualitative data in their research. According to Cathryne Palmer and Amanda Balderston, qualitative research methods have advantages that lie in their ability to provide in-depth explanations about practitioners, experiences, and further details about a source. Using qualitative methods requires that we have an approach to resources that can be useful and provide an appropriate picture for a study (Palmer and Bolderston 2006).

5. Results and Discussion

5.1. The role of middle power in climate change negotiations

A middle power country is one that is neither great small power in terms of strength, capacity, or international influence, and has a proclivity to participate actively in the global order (Jordan, 2003). Even so, this does not imply that middle-power countries must follow all the will of great-power countries. Middle-power countries have a broader range of options and can choose to play in the middle. Besides that, middle-power countries hold on to functional and behavioral approaches, demonstrating that they have the characteristics to contribute to global issues beyond their immediate concern. The middle powers do not intervene in all conflict situations, but the majority of them prefer to play in the middle, between the great and small powers. Countries with middle-power status have some flexibility in determining their policies and expressing their responses to the global order.

The participation of middle powers in climate change negotiations can improve the beneficial outcome. Climate change negotiation conferences, according to Anja Zenker (2018), encourage countries to reach joint agreements with the same goal of combating global climate change (Zengker, 2018). The climate change negotiation conference can also serve as a forum for further discussion of previous agreements' development. COP-24, for example, focused on the implementation of the Paris Agreement. As a result, the agreement was made in the shape of rulebook called Paris Rulebook. It contains agreements, cooperation plans and also guidelines for implementing the Paris agreement program. Effective outcomes and decisions produce profitable agreements and intensify the importance of agreements to combat climate change.

In this article, I situate the role of middle power countries in the climate change negotiation conference of COP-24. Specifically, this article will elaborate the role of Indonesia as negotiator using the notion of symbolic power in the COP-24 negotiation forum. The COP under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is one of the international forums where intermediate powers can contribute to the climate change agenda. In line with the statement from Adam Chapnick and Cranford Pratt, the COP can be an opportunity for Middle power to express their opinion and voicing their response to specific issues. Middle power also has a direct conversation, negotiation and interaction with other countries to get win-win solutions (Kronlid & Lysgaard, 2014).

Through COP organized by the UNFCCC, social space is created as a space for interaction between countries. Extensive and open interaction between countries will lead to fair and equitable achievements. On this occasion, middle power countries can act as mediators, negotiators and also bridges between members (Bagozzi, 2014). As an illustration of middle power countries role, in this article I took Indonesia as a case study. Indonesia at COP-24 having a change to voicing various aspects in supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement at COP-24. Indonesia through DELRI focuses on funding, technology, access, and capacity to support climate change issues. Therefore, international climate change negotiation conferences can be a suitable space for middle powers to contribute freely because they can focus on various aspects of climate change.

5.2 The Position of Indonesia in UNFCC and COP-24

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a framework convention established by the United Nations to facilitate climate change programs and conferences undertaken by various countries. Since 1995, the UNFCCC's framework convention has been known as the Conference of Parties (COP). In general, the UNFCCC's goal is to create an international agreement to combat climate change, with two of the most well-known treaties which is the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, both of treaties aim to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. The UNFCCC, through the COP, is in charge of ensuring consistency in efforts to achieve the main goals of the convention in the form of an international agreement on climate change. One of the examples is COP-24. At this conference, the UNFCCC drove all members to continue discussing the Paris Agreement implementation that is written in The Paris Agreement Rulebook.

 COP-24 produced an international agreement known as "The Paris Agreement Rulebook," also known as "The Katowice Rulebook," which concludes the outcome of COP-24 negotiations as well as guidelines for implementing The Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement Rulebook aims to establish procedures to limit global warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius or 1.5 degrees Celsius. Furthermore, it regulates the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions, with a 12-year plan aiming to reduce CO_2 emissions by 45 percent by 2030. The Paris Agreement Rulebook adopts efficient cooperation within the UNFCC in order to achieve the primary goal of reducing greenhouse gas

emissions to zero levels by the second half of the twenty-first century. The examples of comprehensive cooperation mentioned in the rulebook like working with several important institutions such as the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, IPCC (The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), Financial committee, Technology Executive Committee, and the Paris Committee on Capacity-building to mobilize and support COP24 action plan. The UNFCCC divided its members positions into two categories: Annex 1 and Annex 2. The classification was based on the requirement to reduce emissions. The Annex 1 group is required to reduce emissions by a certain percentage. Its members include Australia, Germany, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and many others that are classified as developed countries or countries in transition that are capable of reducing emissions to a certain level. Meanwhile, Annex 2 includes a number of developing countries such as Indonesia, Fiji, Malaysia, Thailand, and others. This group is not required to reduce emissions, but they must report their emissions status annually and participate in conferences (Pramudianto 2016, p. 80).

According to the grouping system, Indonesia is categorized as an Annex 2 member, which means that it is not required to reduce its emissions. However, as part of its commitment to the Paris Agreement, Indonesia is still required to submit its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) on a regular basis. The Indonesian NDC contains Indonesia's efforts to develop a low-emission and climate-resilient economy by protecting food, water, and energy resources (Masripatin et al., 2017). For example, at COP-24, Indonesia expressed its NDC commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 by up to 29 percent with domestic capabilities and 41 percent with international assistance. Then, through local governments such as the Pidie District Government - Aceh, Gorontalo District, and North Kalimantan Province, Indonesia shares information on domestic activities that contribute to Indonesia's NDC target.

Aside from being required to submit NDC reports, Indonesia is required to actively participate in each conference. Indonesia sent 6,002 delegates to COP-24, known as the Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia (DELRI), to negotiate the implementation of the Paris Agreement based on each division and focus. DELRI is led by Dr. Siti Nurbaya, who is also Indonesia's Minister of Environment and Forestry. DELRI focuses on several critical components. For starters, DELRI focuses on how developing countries should be given more attention in implementing the Paris Agreement. Secondly, DELRI make sure to affirming and renegotiating the fulfillment of funding commitments, technology transfer, and increasing capacity building for middle-power countries like Indonesia to implement the Paris Agreement.

Indonesia is a vulnerable country to climate change, making it one of the countries that can serve as a model for other countries implementing climate change programs. However, as a country with a developing status, Indonesia has some limitations. Its mean that Indonesia has not been able to fully implement all prevention programs. Aside from that, Indonesia is still working to develop the community welfare sector. This situation has caused some stakeholders and UNFCCC members questioning Indonesia's commitment in prevent climate change. One of them is the Indonesian government's plan to double palm oil production by 2020. This procurement is being carried out in order to increase revenue and meet market demands. However, without realizing it, this plan could jeopardize the national climate action target because Indonesia currently has 14 million hectares of oil palm plantations that require natural forests (Wijaya et al., 2017)   In achieving the emission reduction target in accordance with the Paris agreement during COP-24, Indonesia symbolically negotiated for financial support, technology, and capacity building. The negotiations carried out by Indonesia refer to the position of Indonesia as Annex 2, where Indonesia itself not required to reduce it emission but mandatory to deliver NDC. Due to the general limitations of capability in implementing climate change programs, developed countries' support and assistance are needed in order to meet the Paris Agreement goals. This article will also explain Indonesia's needs in terms of financial assistance, technological transfer, and capacity building.

5.3. Three Point of Indonesia Negotiation in COP-24
5.3.1. Financial Support
Financial support is an element that strongly encourage the implementation of climate change prevention programs, especially in developing countries whose finances are not yet strong. With sufficient financial support, this will affect two other points of negotiation, namely technology transfer and capacity building. Financial support can come from the public and private sectors. The public sector comes from domestic, bilateral and multilateral development financing institutions. While the private sector comes from non-financial corporations, commercial financial institutions (banks), or institutional investors. Financial support aims to develop financial flows consistent with a pathway to low-carbon and low-emission development, particularly for developing countries (Bunchner et al., 2019).

Financial assistance from a variety of sources should be managed by one of the institutions in charge of climate finance. The purpose of this management is to organize and address funding for climate change mitigation programs. This agency will help a country organize international financial sources. Also, controlling the investment strategy that aimed as alternative financing for climate change mitigation and adaptation programs. This agency must be managed transparently and effectively by the government. Indonesia, for example, has an institution known as the Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund or known as ICCTF.

The Indonesian government established the ICCTF as a trusted institution to design and manage incoming climate change funding. ICCTF also intends to raise international and domestic climate change funds. Funds obtained will be adjusted to oversee climate change program activities in accordance with regulations. The ICCTF itself consists of a technical committee consisting of representatives from *BAPPENAS* and the Ministry of Finance. ICCTF primary responsibility is to assess the feasibility and impact of proposed climate change activities for funding. (Ministry of Finance Republic of Indonesia, 2019). The establishment of a climate finance institution is an indication of a country's readiness to commit to its responsibility for climate change countermeasures program.

This shows that Indonesia still lack funding sources to fully implement the Paris Agreement program. This, in my opinion, is reasonable given that Indonesia still needs to focus on developing its economy. As a result, not all state budget allocations for climate change issues are prioritized. As a result, one of Indonesia's strategies for preparing to accept financial assistance is to establish an ICCTF institution. As a developing country in need of financial assistance, readiness to manage funds is one of the factors motivating developed countries to provide financial assistance. It also gives a signal to aid providers that aid funds will be effectively allocated to climate change (Table 2).

The ICCTF allocates state budgets as well as international funding from development partners for activities that are aligned with government priorities as outlined in the National Action Plan for Emissions Reduction. The ICCFT Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund (ICCTF) serves as a regulator of instrument funding for the Indonesian government to support climate change programs. By 2030, the goal is to reduce emissions by 29 percent through national efforts and up to 41 percent with international assistance. ICCTF managed to allocate a budget of IDR 198 billion for 40 projects in agriculture, peatland, forestry, and mangrove categories start from 2010 - 2018. With the total reduction of greenhouse gases touching 9,364,562 Ton CO_2E and in detail in the following table 2 (Wagey, 2018).

Table 2. Total Fund Allocation Project 2010-2018 by ICCFT

PROJECT	TOTAL PROJECT	GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION (TON CO_2E)
Agriculture	5	7
Peatland	15	8.721.385
Forestry	17	319.003
Mangrove	3	323.175
TOTAL (Fund Total : IDR 198 Billion)	40 Project	9.364.562 Ton CO_2E

Source: (Wagey, 2018)

Another significant achievement in the negotiation of financial assistance is the encouragement of developed countries to provide financial assistance. One of the outcomes was the decision of Germany and Norway to make financial assistance commitments for climate action. These two countries agreed to double their contributions to the Green Climate Fund. The Green Climate Fund is a forum for developing countries to collaborate on climate change mitigation efforts. The Green Climate Fund would then receive up to $129 million in financial assistance for developing countries. Apart from Germany and Norway, this negotiation also encourages the World Bank to participate in its commitment to climate action. At the end of the conference, the World Bank agreed to increase financial support to $200 billion through 2021.

Based on the proposed theoretical framework, Indonesia has been successful in using the concept of social space to voice financial support negotiations for developing countries. The social space here is a COP-24 negotiation forum, where Indonesia, as a middle power country, uses symbolic power to negotiate with developed countries. At this

COP-24, Indonesia is able to build relations with developing countries to voicing their negotiation to developing countries.

Indonesia through its middle power status has been able to become a representative of developing countries. This can be seen from how Indonesia as a negotiator is able to create a narrative of symbolic power in the form of language, and identity, which is able to create interactions in social space. Because of its position as a middle power, Indonesia is able to convey its concerns to other developing countries. So, Indonesia can convince investors to provide financial assistance. Such as Germany and Norway's decision to double financial support for developing countries. Indonesia has succeeded in obtaining financial support in order to mobilize the implementation of the Paris Agreement program.

5.3.2. Technology Transfer

Currently, developing countries are faced with a double challenge beside fighting climate change, also achieving economic growth. Some developing countries do not yet have the develop climate technological that needed to address climate change issue. If developing countries only relying on locally developed technology, it will take them longer to reach this level of technological progress. This will delay global action to combat climate change. Therefore, technology transfer from developed countries to developing countries is an important component of climate action plans.

The UNFCCC itself includes provisions for the development and transfer of technology in articles 4.5 and 4.7 of the Paris Agreement. The essence of these two articles is to state that developed country parties in Annexes I and II must take all practical steps to facilitate and finance the transfer or access to technology, especially developing country parties. Under articles 4.5 and 4.7, the UNFCCC and the parties recognize the importance of technology transfer and emphasize the need for cooperation between developed and developing countries (Goldar et al., 2019).

The development and transfer of technology related to climate change has received increasing attention over the years. It can be seen in the Paris Agreement, which talks a lot about how countries can fully realize the development and transfer of technology to increase resilience to climate change. Climate technology transfer aims to assist all countries in reducing GHG emissions. As the matter of fact, climate technology focus on renewable energy such as wind energy, solar power, and hydro power. From the beginning of the UNFCCC process, developing and transferring technology to support national climate action has been a critical component. When countries established the first Convention in 1992, they included specific provisions on technology in order to achieve the Convention's ultimate goal. According to the Convention, all Parties should encourage and collaborate in the development and transfer of technologies that reduce GHG emissions (UNFCCC, 2021).

However, at the COP-24 climate change negotiations, there were also further statements about increasing the development and transfer of climate technology. In addition to financial support and capacity building, developing countries also complained about greater technology transfer. they objected because the much larger demand did not match the ability of developing countries to meet it. Therefore, developing countries include the technology transfer agenda in negotiations for assistance from developed countries. In fact, the development of technology transfer is important because it aims to help countries, especially countries that are vulnerable to climate change, to practically adapt climate change programs. In addition, technology transfer can also be a momentum to help developing countries move to a long-term low-carbon development (Rimmer, 2019).

A support for technology development and provision comes from a variety of multilateral institutions as well as bilateral cooperation. To meet and analyze the needs of each country, a report on technology needs is required as an illustration for developed countries in providing technology experts. Indonesia, for example, has submitted a Technology Needs Assessment (TNA). The TNA includes a priority list of technologies that includes the highest technology values from each environmental sector, such as forestry, energy, and waste management. This report contributes to reducing the number of barriers that may arise during the technology transfer process (Minister of Environment and Forestry, 2017).

The Indonesian Delegation presented several outcomes of technology transfer negotiations at COP-24. Despite the emphasis on technology transfer, several developing countries, including Indonesia, face challenges in managing technology. Financial issues and a lack of technology management resources to accommodate technology transfer are among the challenges. As the result, technology transfer still requires financial support and research for the development of technology that is both innovative and environmentally friendly. Furthermore, the Indonesian

delegation requested that this technology transfer be in accordance with the SDGs. This means that, in addition to ensuring GHG reduction and low emissions, it also ensures that technology transfer is compatible with a country's national conditions (Fikarno, 2018).

In this situation, Indonesia symbolically negotiated technology transfer followed by data needs as stated in the Technology Needs Assessment (TNA). Although the clarity of technological support at COP-24 has yet to find a point of certainty, the Indonesian negotiation process is still ongoing. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, financial support is easier to achieve than transfer technology. Due to many developed countries objection to the demand from developing countries which is quite a lot. One of them is how Indonesia conveys that technology transfer is in accordance with the SDGs. Also, Ensure the transfer of technology according to the national conditions of a country. This request is certainly a dilemma for many developed countries before providing technology transfer. Furthermore, considering the capacity building of each country which is not yet strong enough to manage.

5.3.3. Capacity Building

Unlike financial support and technology transfer, capacity building focuses on the country's internal sector in supporting climate change programs. Capacity Building can make the process of implementing climate change programs more effective. Such capacity building will increase the accuracy and completeness of GHG inventories, improve the implementation and achievement of NDCs, develop GHG emission projections and effective technology management in combating climate change problems. Therefore, capacity building is included in negotiations with financial support and technology transfer. Each country can develop capacity by addressing the challenges they face (Partnership on Transparency in the Paris Agreement, 2019). Capacity development is the process of increasing the effectiveness of performance in individuals, organizations, groups, and systems to improve the adaptability of individuals and organizations. It refers to the development and maintenance of individual and group capabilities in the face of changing environmental conditions. Besides being related to the capacity of government staff and institutions, capacity building is also related to increasing local knowledge and awareness of climate change. Financial support and technology transfer are only part of the story if human resources are not supported. Therefore, capacity building is very important in assisting the process of implementing climate change prevention programs (Sterner et al., 2012).

Capacity building, in general, is a more extensive request than financial assistance and technology transfer. Because capacity building must encompass a wide range of things such as education, training, information access, public awareness, community participation, and international cooperation. Therefore, capacity building necessitates regional, bilateral, and multilateral approaches between each country in order to meet a fit requirement for building plans, policies, and actions. It is based on the different "gaps" and "needs" of each country, so there is a need for effective communication to fulfill the capacity building of each country.

Indonesia as a middle power country uses the COP-24 negotiation space to encourage transparency within the framework of the Paris Agreement. Indonesia also intervened to discuss capacity building along with the fact that capacity building is still not seen transparently by developing countries. Therefore, the Indonesian delegation demanded transparency in capacity building during the conference (KumparanNEWS, 2018). In addition to demanding transparency, Indonesia also discussed further the effectiveness of PCCB in identifying capacity building needs in developing countries.

During the COP-24, DELRI emphasized several things related to PCCB. One of the things that attracts attention is ensuring whether the PCCB has fulfilled its objectives in identifying gaps and needs in capacity building in developing countries. In addition, Indonesia encourages the preparation of capacity building based on the gaps and needs of each country to achieve implementation of climate change program. This was urged by Indonesia as a basis for providing recommendations on whether the PCCB should be continued or changed into a stronger organization. From this conference, produced the Annual Technical Progress Report of the Paris Committee of Capacity Building and a review of the Committee. In addition, there is also a COP Decision that has been stipulated in the FCCC/SBI/2018/ L.21 document. This document contains the results of Indonesia's negotiations which emphasize the collaboration of PCCB with Non-Party Stakeholders to support the 2017-2019 PCCB work plan (Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan 2018, p. 29).

In general, Indonesia's three negotiating points at COP-24 were successfully voiced. The use of social space, namely the space to interact with other UNFCCC members, can also be achieved by Indonesia during the negotiation process

at COP-24. As a middle power country, Indonesia have putting its role as a negotiator, mediator and bridging dialogue through negotiations between developed and developing countries. With the concept of symbolic strength, which is language and identity, Indonesia constructs a narrative of symbolic power that is able to give birth to interaction in social space. Indonesia is able to voice its concerns to other developing countries because of its status as a middle power. Its aim is to promote the financial assistance, technical transfers, and capacity building, which are needed to assist developing countries to implement the Paris Agreement program (Figure 1).


Figure 1. Three point of negotiation

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, this article shows that Indonesia is trying to use the middle power as a symbolic tool to increase its interest in COP-24 in Katowice in 2018. By analyzing Indonesia's role in the Katowice conference shows that it has always reaffirmed the importance of developing countries. This repetition shows that Indonesia is trying to provide a social space that aims to create space for developed countries to support developing countries in fighting climate change. As a middle power, Indonesia symbolically represents the identity of a developing country. Indonesia through the delegation of Indonesia voiced three important issues that became problems for developing countries in implementing the Paris Agreement to combat climate change.

From the results of negotiations between the Indonesian side through The Delegation of Indonesia at COP-24, several findings were produced. First, Indonesia uses the status of middle power to play its role as a negotiator, mediator and also to bridge dialogue in voicing the interests of developing countries in the issue of climate change. Second, all of Indonesia's three negotiating points during COP-24 were successfully voiced. However, not all points have the expected outcome. Financial support is easier for developed countries to fulfill, compared to technology transfer and capacity building. It is because technology support and capacity building must be adapted to the different of "gaps" and "needs" of each country. Thus, many developed countries are still considering and need time to review these two points compared to financial support.

Moving forward, this article only focus on the COP-24 multilateral climate change conference held in Katowice in 2018. This will be a good avenue for further research on the role of middle powers at the next conference. Basically, every year the UNFCCC always holds a regular conference in one of its member countries. This article does not really look from the side of other countries, it only focuses on the role of Indonesia during the climate change negotiation process at COP-24. Hence, it would be better if someone explores the role of other middle power countries in the climate change conference so that they can produce a detailed and specific justification for the role of the middle powers.

Acknowledgements

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